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A SOVIET WEEKLY

NEW TIMES

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FROM OUR MAILBAG **(2)**, PEOPLE **(44)**

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No longer a unitary state because the Ukraine said "No." Is Russia the successor to the Union?

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Where are the business people needed for economic reform? They are in the camp from which our correspondent reports

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From our mailbag

■ I was very glad to read in your magazine the article called "The adventures of the Popular Labour Alliance (NTS) in Russia" (No. 39, 1991). For many years we have been led to believe that the NTS was a subversive organization and an enemy of Soviet people. In actual fact, it turned out, NTS members spared no efforts to disseminate the truth about emigration, and promoted education in this country. Thank you very much for the article. I am a teacher and it is very important that we gradually learn more and more about our history. But it is still too early to start writing a new textbook on the history of our state, for the whole truth has yet to be discovered.

I have been brought up in the spirit of socialist realism. In addition, for 32 years I have been a member of the CPSU and it was very painful for me to learn about the Party's new exposures. Once going home after a meeting with our People's Deputy Kalugin, I met my former pupil who asked me: "Are you not ashamed of having lied to us for so many years?" But I sincerely believed that the CPSU served the people...

Valentin Shtanko, 65
Krasnodar Territory

■ I am a regular reader of *New Times*, and I want to ask you some questions.

Where is my Motherland now? When and where will I stop being a migrant, colonizer, invador and, simultaneously, a dirty Russian and cheap labour force? How will mother Russia protect her sons who have involuntarily become emigrants? If all of this means the new political thinking and symbolizes the new traits of our times, then I curse them!

V. Strukov
Tallinn

■ In our difficult and not too bright life, one of the few consolations is reading your magazine. All of your staff are clever, honest and conscientious people who understand suffering and, I am sure, have much more to say to their readers than the magazine can publish.

I hope that you do not lose your courage, as what you write greatly helps us live and bear up, especially those who are not indifferent to the future of our Motherland.

Tamara Koshkova
Khanty-Mansiisk

■ For the past several years your magazine has been paying much attention to domestic problems which is, of course, quite natural. But this makes *New Times* less interesting for foreign subscribers. I am also very surprised that having your own correspondent in Bucharest you publish so very little material about Romania. As far as Marina Shakina's article about our country is concerned, the only thing I could admire was the author's photograph. Unfortunately, the Romanian press did not pay due

Capitalist you should be

■ Mikhail Maley's privatization plan (*New Times*, No. 16/91) suffers from a fatal weakness, to which Maley himself alludes: up to forty percent of Russian enterprises may be unviable. Bankruptcy, and the sale of their assests to other enterprises, may be inevitable for them. Their economic unviability would only be deepened by declaring a three-year freeze on the sale of shares, and such a freeze would also have the highly undesirable effect of delaying the emergence of a capital market, as Mlechin and Chernova point out. Giving employees in state-owned enterprises shares only in their own enterprises is a disastrously unfair idea, and it would be a shame if Russia missed the opportunity to set the world's largest and most influential example of how to privatize an economy well.

John Stehle, an economist at Villanova University, points to an interesting small-scale historical precedent in the United States. According to Professor Stehle, the Amana Society of German immigrants in Iowa, organized along lines of almost pure communism for three generations, decided in 1932 to become a shareholding cooperative, because the members of the society could see that the free-enterprise private economy which surrounded them produced a higher standard of living.

...In his recent book on the economic transition in Hungary, Janos Kornai emphasized the importance of building a new and more independent middle class, with greater control of its economic as well as political destiny. The idea discussed below would do much to build such a middle class in any country moving away from a centrally owned and administered economy. The new middle class would be as broad as it is in the United States or Canada, where most people consider themselves members, whether they work in a factory or an office.

A plan to distribute state-owned assets to the population in equal shares, in a diversified way and without payment, was proposed by Manuel Hinds of the World Bank almost two years ago. The concept is now supported by economists in many lands and across the political spectrum... The government of Poland intends to apply a version of the idea to its large enterprises after a new parliament, free of communist opposition, is elected; and the government of Mongolia has already begun to implement an even more radical plan that gives all citizens vouchers which they can use to buy not only shares in large enterprises but also small assets like trucks and shops.

...These ideas have met resistance among Soviet economists, though. In September 1990, the allegedly radical 500-day plan drawn by Stanislav Shatalin, et. al., rejected distribution on the grounds that people would not properly value freely given assets. More recently, even staunch reformers like Evgeny Saburov, though gradually embracing the concept, have said that it would be dangerous for the state to give away "its" assets. There is a reluctance in Moscow to give up the power of wealth and a fear that inexperienced new entrepreneurs

Communism has been rejected even in the state of Iowa

Migrants, colonizers, invaders and mother Russia

Meccano from Quakers

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

attention to Sergei Kovalyov's article (No. 47, 1990). The author can be praised for his unbiased attitude, delicacy and unpretentious style, which is quite a usual thing in *New Times* nowadays.

Nestor Gheorghiu
Bucharest, Romania

■ I happened to see with my own eyes what charity means for ordinary people in Europe.

I wanted very much to bring with me to Moscow the well-known Lego Meccano for the children of the hospital where I work. I asked Margaret Holman, a member of a London-based Society of Friends (Quakers), and Mrs Rite Jongelung, a former pastor of the protestant church and now a pensioner, to help me. Neither of them was too enthusiastic about my request, explaining that the Lego meccano is a very expensive toy. They asked me whether some "simpler" toys would do. I turned the proposal down, bearing in mind that everything our children have is "simple," as it were: be it medicines, food, hospitals and so on...

However, on the day of my departure I was given a big Lego suitcase. It transpired that during the Sunday service Rite Jongelung's friends told the parisioners about the Moscow hospital for seriously ill children and about my request; and those people gathered 250 dollars. Two months later we received another three cases with the Lego Meccano worth 100 dollars.

What I liked most was that the English people did it without any moralizing and did not boast of their charitable deeds. As to the children of the Moscow hospital No. 38, they adore the Lego Meccano and play with it every day.

E.Zaks
Moscow

■ I read with great interest articles about the Arab-Israeli conflict. The latest contribution "The legends of Zionism" (No. 40/91) is no exception. But I would say, however, that authors do not tell us the whole truth. As I see it, occupation of Arab territories is a retaliatory measure taken in response to the Arab states' aggression. According to the generally accepted international law, an aggressor must pay for its aggression: it should either pay contribution or give away its territories. Thus, very few (except revanchists) doubt the legitimacy of the joining of Eastern Prussia to the USSR after World War II. The same could be said about the Kuril Islands after the crushing defeat of Japan. And another thing to remember is the security of frontiers, especially if the case in point is Israel with its tiny territory. The Golan Heights, if returned to Syria, might be used in the future in the interests of a potential aggressor. No verbal guarantees have any weight – such are the lessons of history. As practice has shown UN troops' guarantees also do not suffice. That is why the slogan: "Land for peace" – is no more than a slogan.

F.Chudakov
Yekaterinburg

will make a mess of things. The dead weight of the old Marxist-Leninist ideology has yet to be completely discarded. Arguments against the distribution of state-owned assets sound disturbingly like the arguments against giving land to the newly emancipated slaves after the American Civil War. The former slaves, it was said, would not work if given property, would not know how to manage it, or would become too independent...

The arguments for distribution are much sounder. New entrepreneurs and managers, and unshackled old managers, could hardly make a bigger mess than the one that the old system has already made and continues to enlarge in the former Soviet Union. State assets rightfully belong to the population which, especially in the former Soviet Union, has earned them by generations of blood and toil. Distribution would activate a fundamental and universal law of human behavior: sticks work, but carrots work better. Distribution would also tackle some of the fundamental obstacles to making the transition from a centrally administered economy to a market economy:

The problem of valuation. No one knows what enterprises in Soviet-style economies are worth. Price information is either non-existent or hopelessly distorted...

Egalitarianism. There is strong public sentiment for economic equality in countries with Soviet-type economies, most of all the old Soviet Union itself, and under this proposal, everyone would start out with an equal share. Economic differentiation is bound to occur in market economies, because some people have the Midas touch where money is concerned, while the rest of us don't; but as the great John Maynard Keynes said long ago, until science and compound interest win their inevitable victory, one must choose between an equal distribution of poverty and an unequal distribution of wealth.

Economic culture. People in centrally administered economies are not used to thinking in the ways required for the operation of a market economy. But if all had an equal stake in a new market economy, then they would be eager to learn...

A chicken-and-egg problem exists, however. The proposal amounts to making everyone an instant capitalist, and it has to be discussed in such market-oriented terms that it has a hard time getting a hearing in administered economy drilled into them for two or three generations. Once heard, though, it would be quickly adopted. Few people would vote against their own enrichment.

Thomas E.Stolper,
US analyst of international affairs, author of a book about relations among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union
New Haven, USA

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

THE UKRAINE

USS – fuss to no purpose?

Drawing by Igor Shein

When not so long ago but rather unexpectedly for everyone the USSR President again raised the issue of a political alliance, when the latest Novo-Ogaryovo pow-wow culminated in the birth of one more draft for such an alliance and republican leaders took the microphone to tell the whole world about the USS (Union of Sovereign States) the basic problem for many was the dissonance of the new abbreviation which in its Russian form sounds rather ugly. There is nothing terrible about it, Boris Yeltsin remarked, we'll get used to it. However, today the situation is such that there may well be no need to get used to it.

The Russian President also declared that there could be no alliance without the Ukraine. Consequently, there will never be such an alliance, as the Ukrainians have voted

for independence, while their new President Leonid Kravchuk angrily rebuffed Gorbachev when the latter said he was sure the Ukraine would return to the Union fold.

True, only some half a year earlier those selfsame Ukrainians as well as voters in eight of the other republics of the erstwhile Union had cast their ballots for continued unity which naturally imparted some semblance of legitimacy to the Novo-Ogaryovo process. Over these six months we all watched the republican leaders get together again and again at Novo-Ogaryovo in the effort to saddle processes, that were taking the country along a totally different path. Now we see that these efforts have been abortive, as the Novo-Ogaryovo decisions has been left to parliamentary solution. In these six months the world has changed completely, basically due to those three days in August. The republics have introduced customs barriers, have nationalized Union property and the Army, and have announced intentions of introducing their own money and establishing their own national guards. Meanwhile Russia procrastinated with her reforms in an endeavour to adjust to the vacillating moods of her partners. By now though we seem to have reached a time when all realize that we must stake neither on the West nor on one another. The USS appears to have been stillborn.

Nevertheless, it is quite possible that some sort of political alliance will be formed, true, without the Ukraine, the Transcaucasian republics and Moldova. However, scarcely will it comprise that confederation of which President Gorbachev dreamed as hardly will there be any need for a central parliament or central president.

Gennady Burbulis, Russia's Secretary of State, thinks we should not dramatize the situation. Unlike his patron, this strong man of Russia is convinced that the republic will get along without the Ukraine. He is hence girding her to solo or at least lead in the choir. Russia has accepted erstwhile Union commitments along with its foreign debt and is paying the Union President his salary out of her own pocket. She will now move ahead without looking aside, intimating that the others should either adjust to her or grin and bear it.

We already see which of the republics Russia will attract with her ruble-based economic zone. These are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which both announced recently undertakings similar to what Russia's new government has programmed. Apparently the other Central Asian republics and Byelorussia will also join in. Nonetheless, the endless stream of elections and referenda, whose outcomes often clashed, have generated a welcome certainty as regards the republics, with each now having its own starting point and giving free play to the others. The main thing now is to get moving.

The referendum: before and after

Has the Ukraine seceded from the Union?

Svetlana Ryaboshapka

The Ukraine's national referendum, confirming the Ukrainian Independence Act, has come and gone. In it a fraction over 87 percent of the total number who went to the polls favoured the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, which is a more than conclusive result. There has now appeared on the map of Europe a new state equivalent to France in area and with a population of 52 million, one furthermore in an advantageous geopolitical position, with fertile land and what is most important, best prepared of all the former republics of the erstwhile USSR to integrate in the European and world economic setup. Though one may by virtue of character training and political views look differently at an independent Ukraine, one must necessarily count with its existence and its interests.

The State Emergency Committee as a motive force for progress

Ever since August 19, the people living on one sixth of the earth's landmass have divided into the two categories of those who felt scared during the putsch and those who have been feeling scared and very much so, after it. In this respect the Ukraine's population and parliament are no exception. Indeed, the members of the Ukraine's Communist Party and the parliamentary majority felt rather queasy on that red letter day of August 24 when none other than Leonid Kravchuk himself, a member of the CPSU Central Committee and of that Central Committee's Politbureau as well as former Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, announced that he was no longer a Communist but simply chairman of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet. Upon which the parliamentary Communist majority faction of "239-4" was frantic, everybody wondering which way they should now go. The way out was indicated by that self-same Leonid Kravchuk, who told the majority to back the democrats who had long called for a Ukrainian Independence Act and for independence as such. Yet at this point one must specially note that the adoption of this Act on August 24 was by no means consequent upon apparat games, even though, at a cursory glance, to say that sort of thing may conflict with everything that was said earlier. With amazing inconsistency opponents of the very notion of an independent Ukrainian state regard the Independence Act as both intrigue by the Communist Party apparat and a nightmarish design of the nationalists. As a rule the truth lies somewhere halfway. The point is that the strength the Communist Party apparatus enjoyed was due precisely to its unity and indivisibility within the confines of the USSR. Hence there seemed to be no reason for this apparat to distance itself from Party comrades. When campaigning against Ukrainian independence the NTS (Popular Labour Alliance), some Russian MPs and local advocates of a united and indivisible Soviet Union exploited the argument that as the Ukraine's conservatives feared a strong Russian democracy that was precisely why "they sought to distance themselves from Russia." In spite of current views that the Ukraine's democratic forces are relatively weak, the referendum's outcome indicates that the ideas these democratic forces advocate have the backing of the overwhelming majority of the republic's population. May we also note that talk of an extraordinarily strong stance of democratic forces in Russia is overexaggerated, as is illustrated by recent splits.

It is my profound conviction that this virtually unanimous approval of the Independence Act by the Ukrainian Parliament wherein only two votes were against and 380 in favour, is due not to fear of Yeltsin's reforms, or all the more to any sudden stupendous eye-opener for the republic's former Communists. Rather does it stem from that powerful instinct for self-preservation, which is so characteristic of every living thing, and consequently of the Ukraine's MPs, who had run on the Communist ticket in their time. Though apparatchiks may be guilty of many sins, one cannot deny their sensitive ear for which way the wind blows. At any rate the State Emergency Committee show in Moscow came as the final straw, after which even Ukrainian diehards realized what was what and raised the cry to abandon the sinking USSR ship.

The trumps in the Ukraine's political pack of cards

Over the next five years the Ukraine's newly elected President will largely shape the republic's external and internal policies.

Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukraine's first president

Born in 1934, Leonid Kravchuk, a native Ukrainian, holds the academic title of Candidate in economics. In October 1988, when Shcherbitsky was still First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, he was appointed chief of its ideological department. In the following year he was made a member of its Politburo and Second Secretary, and finally the CPSU Central Committee member. In that same year of 1989 he was elected the Chairman of the Ukrainian Republic's Supreme Soviet after Ivashko had vacated the office. Right afterwards, the views or at least the pronouncements of the Ukrainian Communist Party's chief ideologue somewhat changed, thereby to re-scale values, which, incidentally, was only to be welcomed. "Many of those people, whom I could call colleagues," Leonid Kravchuk remarked at the time, "would want me as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to always back the majority and vilify the opposition. However, I am the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, not a Secretary of the Central Committee! Meanwhile, many simply cannot abandon illusions of taking part not in a parliamentary session, but in a Party plenary meeting." The most popular charge levelled against him at the time was of "flirting" with the opposition. For several years running, we watched Gorbachev playing a somewhat similar would-be middle-of-the-road role.

Naturally the abortive August coup put paid to Kravchuk's Party career. On August 25, he announced his resignation from the CPSU, true predating it August 19. Kravchuk linked his new non-party political career to hopes of becoming President of an independent Ukraine. Quite likely during the abortive August coup, he, shivering with apprehension, drew the basic conclusion that republican authority should be made a truly potent factor. Realizing that democratic forces had long evolved the means and mottos to that end, he took matters into his own hands, having incomparably greater opportunities thereto, and for the first time officially announced: "The only way today is to secure independence and become a great civilized state, united with other nations in harmony and accord."

In effect President Kravchuk's present stance is a mixture drawn from the programmes of the RUKh movement and of the moderately radical Ukrainian Republican Party, as one of the more influential political parties. This implies acquiring all the attributes of national independence such as its own monetary unit, customs, bank and army. Yet at the presidential elections neither the RUKh movement nor the URP, nor other parties of a national democratic trend supported Kravchuk: on the contrary, they ran such opposition candidates, as Vyacheslav Chornovil and Levka Lukyanenko. Which shows us that the current President's decisions and actions will be constantly thoroughly supervised, thus instilling hopes that no Gamsakhurdia type development will occur in the Ukraine, the more so as that runs completely counter to Kravchuk's own style.

The Ukraine's Russians: two attitudes to independence

The Ukraine's Russians who total 20 per cent of the entire population comprise a long-standing factor, which means that in the new independent Ukraine they will continue to live alongside of its 128 nationalities. Hence no politician in the Ukraine will afford to ignore their interests and sentiments. Until recently relations between Ukrainians and Russians were cloudless, quite amicable, the only jarring note being the Russofication so steadily enforced by Union authorities. How these relations would develop largely depends on whether the Russians would back Ukrainian independence. Prior to the referendum, Ukrainian politicians had to pay close notice to developments in the republic's sole autonomous region of the Crimea. They spotted some interference in its internal affairs, more specifically by Russia. I mean firstly the recent visit paid there by Russian Federation MPs Nikolai Travkin, Victor Aksyuchits and Mikhail Astafyev, who urged locals to believe that the Crimea's transfer under Russia's jurisdiction was only logical and that they could expect nothing of the Ukraine except "enforced Ukrainianization" and sundry other repression. Did they think this as meaning that the Crimea had not one Ukrainian school or Ukrainian-language newspaper, even though 20 percent of the local population are Ukrainians?

However, despite the campaigning by some Moscow-based Russian mass media against Ukrainian independence, the referendum demonstrated that most of the Ukraine's Russians understand and support the desire for independence. Which will unquestionably furnish a fine basis for the new relationship between Ukrainians and Russians in the new Ukraine.

A new life

Apart from the Crimean issue, Ukrainian politicians were also upset by the sharply negative response coming from Gorbachev and the Russian Parliament to US President' Bush's declaration that he planned to recognize the Ukraine after the referendum had confirmed its Independence Act. Leonid Kravchuk was hence obliged, before the referendum took place, to appeal to the Ukrainian nation and more specifically state: "The referendum provides us with the unique chance of resurrecting the thousand-year-old tradition of Ukrainian statehood with all its attributes. We shall build a new Ukraine that will be peace-loving, law-abiding and open... Our country is already subjected to unpecedented pressure and an anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign is in full swing. In effect, we are being blackmailed by economic sanctions and presumptuous intervention in our internal affairs. In this connection, let me remind you that it is the sole prerogative of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet to speak on behalf of the nation. Even the President of the former Union may not change that. Nobody ever authorized him to speak for the Ukrainian nation before the referendum and to issue improper statements. With its own statehood, the Ukraine will embark upon the road of human civilization. We have everything we need to that end."

Not only the USA and Canada but also France, Sweden and nearly all East European states have, proceeding from the results of the referendum, declared their intentions of recognizing the Ukraine. Romania, however, adopted a somewhat odd stand, resolving not to recognize the results of the referendum, and laying claim to part of the Ukraine's Bukovina Region. Meanwhile Gorbachev is manifestly guilty of shortsightedness when he says he does not regard the referendum results as the Ukraine's refusal to participate in the USS.

KIEV

US White House and the Ukraine

The USA has apparently reconsidered its attitude to the Union and former Union republics. Kiev may count on recognition

In the USA the White House statement of intent to grant "early" diplomatic recognition to the Ukraine after its official declaration of independence, which was announced several days before the referendum, has been unanimously qualified as a watershed in Washington's policy vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union.

Today common sense, rather Realpolitik, has induced Washington to realize that all further courtseys to the Kremlin and attempts to ignore the irrepressible thirst for independence of the various Soviet republics, especially Russia and the Ukraine, may cost it more than the ephemeral advantages to be gained from Union centre control over the former super-power's nuclear heritage and foreign debt.

The White House's reorientation has obviously been prompted by considerations of military strategy and geopolitics. No wonder US Secretary of Defence Richard Cheyney was first to urge that the Ukraine be recognized as early as possible. In this he was echoed by the President's national security aide Brent Scowcroft. No doubt they have lesser hope now of expecting the Kremlin to settle the nuclear weapon issue and other aspects of arms reduction and control in the Ukraine and the other republics. After Senate ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe, the US administration contacted not only Moscow and Russia, but also Kiev, calling for the earliest ratification of the said agreement.

"Now that the Ukraine is independent, European politics have entered a new phase," Andrzej Karkoszka of the Institute for East-West Security Studies told me, "So if Kiev were nevertheless to decide to carry out plans to form a large army, that could inhibit Poland from reducing her own army which, in turn, could pull Germany up short. Much also depends on whether the Ukraine will stay friends with its neighbours or be embroiled in blocs spearheaded against some third state or states."

Both politicians and experts are convinced that in a year or two after the declaration of independence, common sense, economic interests and the development of the inferiority complex into a superiority complex will induce the Ukraine to establish the closest of economic relations with its neighbours, especially Russia.

Though American Ukrainians stake heavily on Ukrainian potential, American experts note such vulnerable aspects of its economy as a bankrupt Donbas, a totally unwanted large military industrial complex, its many atomic power plants, which have nothing to replace them as sources of power, and finally, its own negligible oil resources.

Kiev, Mother of Russia's cities, is today capital of the independent republic of the Ukraine

However, the Ukrainians must be given their due for having completely confused the Americans by their many conflicting declarations, pronouncements and explanations as regards nuclear weaponry and a future Ukrainian army. Some American experts quite seriously took reports in our mass media that the Russian leadership had supposedly disscussed possibilities of a preemptive nuclear strike at the Ukraine. One particular cause for anxiety is that of frontiers, especially the Crimea. For however odd this kind of reasoning may seem, aware of the graphic illustration that Yugoslavia affords, Washington has not discarded in its calculations the danger of a power struggle between Russian and the Ukraine over the border issue, which, to call a spade a spade, spells war.

Offering the promise of diplomatic recognition, Washington continues to haggle with the Ukraine. The special US envoy, that is going to Kiev this week, will note the "anxiety felt" or, in plain words, the terms upon which the US administration is prepared to honour this promise.

These terms encompass three groups of issues, notably observance of human rights, questions of military strategy and economic problems. Note that these very same issues, plus the problem of regional conflicts were limelighted in recent Soviet-American relations as well.

By acting to all intents and purposes for its Western allies with whom it has already had consultations as concerns the Ukraine, Washington hopes to get Kiev to guarantee observance of the rights of the national minorities especially the eleven and a half million Russians living in the Ukraine and also respect international boundaries and borders with the other republics.

As regards matters of military strategy Washington expects Kiev to reaffirm its readiness to observe the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe as well as treaties on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the prohibition of biological weapons. The White House would like Kiev to either destroy the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory or place them under a joint command with the other republics.

Naturally, Kiev will be asked to vouch for repayment of its portion of the erstwhile Union's external debt. However, apparently the USA and the other members of the Big Seven will have to exclude it from accords as to the joint responsibility the former Soviet republics bear for the former Union's external debts and consent to Ukrainian wishes to foot its part of the bill independlently. Washington is gradually reconsidering economic relations with the erstwhile Union and more specifically with the Ukraine. In all probability, of the $1.5 billion credit that all the republics are to get to purchase American grain, the money loaned to the Ukraine will be granted separately. Yet currently neither the Ukraine, nor Russia can count on massive American aid, inasmuch as in the USA nowadays its tardy emergence from economic recession calls for a tighter rein on financial resources.

Evgeny Rusakov,
our own correspondent
NEW YORK

Tense atmosphere on the eve of presidential elections in Moldova

The presidential elections will be held in Moldova (former Moldavia) on December 8. Three republics exist *de facto* on its territory after the referendums on independence conducted in the Dniester-side and Gagauz areas

In the opinion of Popular Front leader Iurie Rosca, the Republic of Moldova is no more than "an historical perversion" and has no chance of being recognized by the world community. That is why the only way out for it is to unite with Romania, and moreover, without delay.

Mircea Ion Snegur, the current president of the republic and the only presidential candidate, disagrees with the Popular Front. He contends that 9[illegible] percent of Moldova's popu[illegible] lation does not even want t[illegible] hear about unification and therefore no responsibl[illegible] politician can make it a ho[illegible] potato. However, Snegu[illegible] does not brush aside the ver[illegible] idea of unification. In h[illegible] opinion, the right momen[illegible] for this step will come whe[illegible] Kishinev has under its con[illegible] trol not only the Moldavian part of Bessarabia, inhabited mostly by Moldavians, bu[illegible] also the rebellious Gagau[illegible] and Dniester-side areas a[illegible] well as South and North Bes[illegible] sarabia and North Bukovina, now part of the Ukraine.

Split in the "Moldavian bloc"

The question of unification central for Moldavian pol[illegible] icy, has split the "Moldavian bloc" which seemed monolithic during the strug[illegible] gle to declare Moldavian th[illegible] official language of the re[illegible] public. The Popular Front accuses Snegur of abandon[illegible] ing the "national ideal" and exploiting Romanophobia which the current president fomented when he was a top party leader of the republic. In his turn, Snegur points to the extremist and irresponsible bahaviour of the Front, the incompetence of its leaders, and hints at their connections with the mafia. The dispute between the "opposition," as the Front now calls itself, and the republican leadership backed by the Agrarian Party sometimes lessens the sharpness of ethnic contradictions in Moldova.

Snegur is right in saying that the vast majority of Moldavians, and especially Russophones, strongly oppose unification with Romania. However, he and his advisors are unable, and are not even trying, to substantiate or even formulate an alternative political strategy. What they do is refer to the pressure of "economic imperatives," the economic necessity. But such arguments bring about charges of shortsighted policy and lack of will. That is why Snegur is compelled to make advances to the unionists, the Romanophile intellectual elite of the republic.

By playing the "anti-Romanian card" Snegur, the only presidential candidate, hopes to win the votes of most Moldavians, especially in rural areas, and regain the trust of a part of the Russophones, who fear very much that one fine day they will be under the rule of Bucharest and who have not forgotten the pogroms staged by Popular Front volunteers last year. He thinks that the Russian-speaking citizens of Moldova will vote for him as "the saviour from Romania and Front militants" and that they no longer remember that it was the Front which placed him in the saddle. Snegur is likely to be elected president on December 8 in spite of the calls by the Popular Front and the Intermovement to boycott the elections. The Intermovement questions the sincerity and firmness of another address of the current president. But can the positions of these organizations stand up to the powerful support given Snegur by heads of local administrations who, under a new law, are appointed by the president and accountable to him?

The "bank war"

"Separatist" presidential elections and referendums

on independence took place on December 1 in the unrecognized Dniester-side and Gagauz republics. After that the split of Moldova seems to have become irrevocable. The process could be checked and even reversed if Kishinev seriously considered the proposals of these regions for establishing a federation in Moldova. However, the current and future president scornfully declines these proposals. An even more negative attitude has been taken by the Popular Front.

After the conclusion of conciliation protocols in October through the mediation of members of the Russian parliament and under the pressure of the Russian leadership, the relations between Kishinev and the Dniester-side and Gagauz areas returned to the "neither peace nor war" formula. The conciliation commission set up in accordance with the protocols proved ineffective because Kishinev exerted financial pressure on the Dniester-side area by refusing to pay for its goods. The bank war began last spring after the Dniester-side and Gagauz areas had decided to institute their separate bank and budget systems. Recently this war entered a new stage. Kishinev has achieved a certain success at this stage, because the two areas had to register their banks in the capital of Moldova. However, the Dniester-side authorities insist that the 500 million rubles "overpaid" by them remain in the area. With the Moldavian budget deficit exceeding one billion rubles and the economic plight of the republic, this demand would simply have dreadful consequences.

The legal and financial chaos in the rebellious Dniester-side and Gagauz republics, manifested also in the existence of parallel law-enforcement and judicial bodies, threatens to grow into a bloody tragedy at any moment. This is what happened in the Gagauz town of Vulkaneshty between November 11 and 13. The clash was provoked by an argument and a fight between the Gagauzes, on their way from the neighbouring Gagauz village in southern Bessarabia (situated in the Ukraine) and Moldavian customs officials who examined their luggage on the border between the two former Union republics. As a result of the incident, one of the customs officials killed P. Mitis, a 30-year-old Gagauz. The funeral of Mitis developed into an anti-Moldavian demonstration. Gagauzes surrounded the buildings of the local police, court and prosecutor's office and set them on fire. Units of the republican riot police were moved into Vulkaneshty. During a fight one member of the riot police was killed and three were wounded. There were also three wounded Gagauzes. The riot police had to withdraw.

VIEW FROM BUCHAREST

The Moldavian knot

Romanian opposition parties constantly raise the question of Bessarabia and its immediate reunification with the mother country, the reunion of all "historic Romanian territories," namely North Bukovina, the Herta ans Khotin regions and the south of Bessarabia, which was included in the Ukraine in 1940. They accuse the government and the parliament of unwillingness to speed up this process, the lack of a firm line for recreating "Greater Romania." Demands were made that the question of North Bukovina and South Bessarabia should be raised before December 1, the day of a referendum on the independence of the Ukraine. Some even proposed giving away the Dniester-side area, which has never been Romanian land. Some time ago the Ukrainian parliament introduced amendments in the criminal law of the republic. They envisage responsibility for encroachment on the territorial integrity of the republic, also on the part of foreigners. This decision is regarded as a warning to Romania and the people of North Bukovina.

However, policy must not be guided by emotions or nostalgia for the past. The Romanian leaders seem to recognize that there are two independent states with one and the same language and having common history and culture. The two republics have signed agreements on cooperation and broader economic ties, the establishment of diplomatic relations and mutual trips. Their citizens can travel without restrictions with any document proving their identity. Bucharest favours a gradual solution of the problem of Bessarabia's reunification with Romania, in accordance with the evolution of the situation in Europe. As for borders, Romania has signed the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter and intends to observe them.

The advocates of an immediate unification of Bessarabia with Romania forget that they are dealing not with a former Romanian province but an independent republic with most of its population supporting precisely this system of government, a republic with its own history and specific problems, (the Dniester-side area, for instance), a republic whose economy will collapse without preserving ties with former Union republics. The advocates of immediate unification ignore the imperatives of good-neighbour policy and the fact that the former Soviet Union accounted for over 26 percent of Romania's foreign trade.

During his recent visit to Bucharest Moldovian Premier Valeriu Muravski said that the two parties discussed the speeding up of economic integration with Romania and, through its mediation, with the West. He added that, using Moldova's relations with republics of the former Union, Romania would be able to "penetrate into the vast market stretching from the Dniester to the Pacific."

Vladimir Pismarov,
our own correspondent in Romania

President today, unification tomorrow?

The experience of Moldova and, incidentally, some other Union republics, shows that it is impossible to run a multinational society effectively by relying only on one ethnic group and removing others from political power. This engenders instability and chaos and eventually the desire to use authoritarian methods with the aim of preventing the final collapse. The dangers facing an autocrat – the illusion of his omnipotence and the temptation to find "simple" and "easy" decisions – often lead to an even greater catastrophe. Will Moldova be able to avoid a disaster? A great deal depends on the course of events in the country as a whole. If the Union institutions, primarily the army, break down completely, war will become inevitable in Moldova. On the other hand, if the centrifugal and autarchic tendencies lead to the final secession of the Ukraine from the Union, Moldova will automatically be cut off from its economic partners. The President of the republic, trying on the laurel wreath of a national hero, might then say that the time for unification (with Romania) has come.

Vladimir Solonar,
people's deputy of the Republic of Moldova
KISHINEV

Union people

Yesterday they embodied the Union, today they are expatriates, and tomorrow many of them will become repatriates. Who will solve their problems?

Vadim Makarenko and Dmitry Trenin

The breakup of the Soviet Union has created not only the problem of division of its property. It is assumed that the legal successors to the Union will also accept its commitments, including debts. The foreign debt of the USSR has been widely discussed for a long time, with leading politicians and experts airing their opinions on the subject. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about the internal debt of the Union.

Debts, external and internal

The question of internal commitments of the Soviet state is much more complex and it is difficult to estimate them. Only a small part of the internal debt is recorded in the form of securities (state-loan bonds, for instance) and pension commitments. However, the question of even this part is confused. It is not clear who will pay for the bonds and from what income, and where the money for pensions will be found.

The Soviet Union had commitments which are not recorded legally and therefore do not have a mechanism for fulfillment. They include commitments to the people now called migrants. This large social group includes many workers of industrial and defence complexes built by the Union in various republics, as well as servicemen and pensioners. All these people, tens of millions of them, were in fact "Union workers." They virtually embodied the Union, its heavy and defence industries, space research and military power.

The republics no longer need many of them in their former capacity. Moreover, most national movements fighting for independence from Moscow regard the "Union people" as a potential "fifth column." Coming to power, some zealots of national independence openly call for evicting "migrants" from the now sovereign republics, fearing that they will become "clients" of a new "imperial Russia." The situation is fraught with large-scale conflict. Who will help these people? Only yesterday the central government, disregarding the borders between republics, planned the construction of engineering works and atomic power plants, laid shipyards, and decided where to station troops. Today it is unable to take any measures with regard to former Union republics. It is also unable to defend "its people" legally in the social and economic respects. What's to be done?

Many say that since most "migrants" are ethnic Rusians it is Russia which must take care of them. Its leaders officially declared that they would not remain indifferent to the fate of compatriots living in other republics. The possibilities of the Russian Federation are not unlimited, however. In addition, it should foresee the possible scale of forced repatriation and ensuing collisions. Therefore, Russia must act while it is possible to avert the worst outcome or at least to soften violent conflicts.

How to avoid reverse migration

Measures should be taken first of all to give equal opportunities to every citizen of any sovereign republic and prevent discrimination on the basis of ethnic orgin and language or for political motives. This will weaken or at least retard sweeping migration back to Russia. At the same time a partial return of migrants to the places of former residence or to ethnically kindred republics can hardly be avoided. Resettlement should therefore be organized in the best possible way and preparation started today. It's a pity that so little has been done in this respect over the last few years when the course of events in national republics was already evident. No interrepublican agreements on repatriation and programmes for the settlement of repatriates have been worked out, though there is foreign experience in matters like this. For instance, after the war the Federal Republic of Germany gave refuge to eight million former residents of East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia and the Sudetenland on the territory only five times that of the Moscow region.

The Russian-language population in the outlying republics is essentially a victim of the former policy of the central government for which it was an additional argument in favour of preserving the Union state. Russians helped to develop the Crimea, virgin land in Kazakhstan, and other territories.

The flow of expatriates and refugees is growing from day to day

The foundations of a modern society have been laid in Central Asia. National states have now appeared on the borders of Russia proper. They have at last set up barriers to the endless migration of Russians to other territories. It seems that Russians are now returning home where there is a lot of work to do and they should not find themselves unnecessary.

But who will pay for the removal ans settling down of hundreds of thousands or perhaps several million people? This problem concerns not only Russians. In one way or another, the resettlement of repatriates or refugees will affect all former Union republics. The solution of the problem depends on how enlightened the national egoism of one or another republic will prove.

Autumn of nationalizers

This autumn can be described as an "autumn of nationalizers." Having rejected the schemes of dividing the union property, which seemed too complicated to them, the sovereign republics have nationalized all the property within their territory. In this way the republican parliaments substantially augmented the national wealth within a few days. The Union cannot simply be "dissolved," however, without paying off its debts. The republics have embarked on the path of social revenge. Among the unfortunate are first of all those who were associated with the central government, on whom, as it seemed, Moscow could rely in the past. Celebrations on the occasion of an accidentally won victory can later prove to be a big loss.

It should be remembered that the possession of property also presupposes responsibility for it. By becoming de facto successors to the Union, the republics cannot avoid a certain share of its obligations, at least with regard to the social groups in need of support.

Are they able to provide support for these groups? The cost of the nationalized Union property is many times over the possible expenditure on programmes for the resettlement and reintegration of citizens who will express the desire to move to another republic. The new sovereign republics are quite able to pay their share of the USSR's internal debt. But will they want to do that?

The republics are not anxious to pay the debts which can seemingly be disputed ("it is not we who invited you to come here"). It is not convenient to refuse to pay them. However, a "compromise" can be found. They make promises but do not fulfill them, especially since there is a good way of doing so. The lower authorities are charged with the responsibility for carrying out a decision, though money is not allocated for this purpose. It is in this way that retired servicemen are "provided" with housing. Under a law servicemen retired from the armed forces must be provided with housing within three months. Local government bodies are responsible for putting the law into effect. However, local Soviets have not received money for the construction of houses. The Soviet servicemen stationed in the Baltic republics recently made a statement unprecedented in the history of the Soviet army. We shall move to a new place only when decent living conditions are ensured for us there, they declared. It is possible that the army will not want to assume responsibility for the country's destiny. However, it would be a great delusion to believe that it will remain indifferent to its own fate.

Military "immigrants" represent a force to reckon with, at least owing to their position. There will be more civilian immigrants, however. The army will either go or receive a different status barring its participation in the political life of the host republics. But the Russian-speaking population will remain. Local authorities can, of course, use discriminatory laws against Russians, deprive them of their civil rights. They can complicate to the utmost problems connected with work, repatriation, housing, pensions. But this policy will certainly be disapproved by the world community. It will become a source of internal instability of the new states. Lastly, whatever the attitude of the new states to the emerging confederation of sovereign states may be, they cannot separate and will have to build a new relationship between them.

Stop the "expropriation"

In the future, stability can be ensured only by proper integration of former citizens of the USSR in the new republican communities arising on the place of constituent republics. The best way out is to reduce repatriation to the minium. However, whether people leave or stay they should not feel unfortunate. Despair opens the way to violence.

The assumption of the right of legacy is always a complex process. The heirs must not only divide the legacy but also accept the debts. The interconnected problem of property and debt can be solved, for instance, by means of dividing the shares of Union enterprises without the physical division of property. Each republic would receive its part of the Union property after negotiations between all the successors to the Union. Part of the shares could be used to pay the internal debt. The incomes received from these shares would be transferred to the pension funds of corresponding republics. Another part of the shares would be used for carrying out common programmes – conversion, reduction of the armed forces, and resettlement of re-emigrants. This could be done by existing interrepublican bodies and by new bodies formed for the solution of these problems.

The proposed way seems to be considerably more civilized than the "expropriation" to which republics resort today. The statements that the expropriated enterprises are defunct and were themselves expropriators in the past do not give legal grounds for their seizure today.

One can object by saying that the sharing of enterprises has no chance of success. For political reasons the republican authorities are already unable to renounce what they have done. It's a pity if this is so. In any case, the admission by sovereign republics of their share of the internal debt, in whatever form it is done, corresponds to their long-range interests just as the division of responsibility for the external debt. Those who do not understand this doom themselves to sanctions. Punishment for ignoring internal commitments may prove more serious than that envisaged in the charter of the World Bank or the International Moneraty Fund, and it will be equally inevitable.

ВОЛГА В ДНЕПР

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THE PICTURE SPEAKS LOUDER THAN WORDS

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Congratulations on the good buy

Tatiana Ivanova

Boris Yeltsin has made the same mistake that former Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov did: he announced liberalization of prices before it actually started...

If I were not me, but a famous TV critic, I would be asked to specify my favourite TV programme of last week. I would reply: ah, there was one small episode I can't forget!

The TV showed a handsome thirty-something man looking like an ordinary Soviet. He was interviewed because he had just bought the Danilovskiye public baths in Moscow paying twenty million rubles for them at an auction.

The episode did not take more than thirty seconds. The man only had the time to say that he had become rich not long ago. The TV reporters contrived to show the buy itself: half-ruined walls, cracked brickwork, rotten floorboards and empty window frames. The sinister and horrible ruins – that's all that has remained from the old Danilovskiye public baths. So characteristically Soviet...

"What are you going to do with this?" the reporter asked and there was a note of sincere compassion ringing in his voice. I remember the answer almost verbatim:

"My birthday is June 21. I want to have a steam bath at the Danilovskiye for my birthday and I invite you to join..."

I am sure all will be as he said. The baths have found an owner and they will reopen after a few months' time. As-for the municipal services, it would have taken them ten to thirty years to restore the baths...

I visualize the happy owner of the baths studying old books on the traditional Russian art of steam baths. Steam baths used to be regarded as a universal medicine in Russia. In addition to the steam room he will have a swimming pool there, and all kinds of showers, a massage parlour, and a hair dresser's. In nice big halls customers will be served beer, crawfish, cured fish, salted nuts and anything that goes with beer, there will be samovars, strong tea with jams and honey and cakes, and customers will drink tea from crystal glasses. And a kind doctor will attend to customers making sure no one takes too much steaming... Everything will be clean and nice and comfortable there...

And the children of that man will go to study in Paris, or London, or Rome, if they wish. They will collect pictures and patronize the arts and sponsor orphanages in their native city...

The man who bought the Danilovskiye baths for twenty million rubles, and who must have still more money in his possession, has today to hunt for milk and bread and salt across Moscow like a greyhound.

C'mon, you are going to tell me, such people don't have problems, they buy things on farmers' markets or at hard currency stores.

I do not think so. First, no farmers' market or hard-currency store can have everything that a person needs every day. OK, let us not take the people who have enough money to buy the Comecon building, or the Danilovskiye, or a bread store on Petrovka or a grocery on Prospekt Mira. Let us take those who can buy more modest things in comparison with the above-mentioned acquisitions. For example the people who are not discouraged by the prospect of buying a three hundred grammes of sausage which retails at SUR 160 a kilo.

Such people number thousands if not millions today. I have recently seen a queue to buy the 160-ruble sausage and I would have joined it had I found where it ended and had I needed the sausage badly enough to put up with the crush and the stuffy atmosphere of the shop...

The leaders of Russia are inexplicably afraid that people "will wipe them out" if they see expensive food on sale... Who's going to do the wiping out? The frail babushkas? The calm desperate women in grey knitted caps? People who can spent nights registering themselves in queues for sugar or cheese?

I feel pity for all of them, all of us, the unfortunate ones who are sometimes lucky to get something to eat to stay alive from the state-run shops, which in fact went private decades ago and are used to cashing in on selling food on the side.

But I feel even greater pity for our unreasonable system of government which we suffered so much to get and praised so much after we got it. It will be wiped out, no doubt about it. It will be wiped out soon and for good. It will be wiped out by the force it is not afraid of at all: the strong, healthy, and rich young people. They are not to be humiliated. It is by their labour and knowlege that the wealth is created which the system of government is going to divide justly between the rich and the poor. An unintimidated, strong and self-confident person will not put up with humiliation, and such people's displeasure can be really dangerous. They need a leadership that respects them. It must be taken into account that those who tried to wipe out the pro-democracy leaders before, were only not-so-generously paid servants. Those whom the current system humiliates now will do the wiping out professionally and willingly as they do any business.

Boris Yeltsin has made the same mistake that former prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov did: he announced liberalization of prices before it actually started. The man who bought the Danilovskiye baths was not very rich in Ryzhkov's time. In fact, anything that happened in Ryzhkov's time happened in a different country. I do not really mean freedom. I mean that in Ryzhkov's time a salary of fifteen hundred rubles a month used to be seen as a miracle... ■

LITHUANIA

A Pandora's box from KGB

The files of former KGB agents change hands

Chargé d'Affaires of the Lithuanian Republic in Moscow, Egidijus Bičkauskas, didn't show much enthusiasm at my request to meet with Balys Gajauskas who heads a special commission investigating the KGB's activity in Lithuania. He said: "I'm against the idea of interviewing him now. Making KGB documents public is a very delicate matter and is frought with unpredicable consequences. I will relate your request to Vilnius." And hung up. I feared that I wouldn't be able to meet the man heading the commission whose work has become legendary in Lithuania. Moreover, Lithuanian colleagues had warned me that Gajauskas was a reticent man in general and avoided interviewers. Nevertheless I got a surprising reply call from Bičkauskas the next day: "Strangely enough, Gajauskas agrees to grant an interview, exclusively for your magazine, *New Times*. He is presently having a short stopover in Moscow. Come and see him." An hour later I arrived at the hotel by the Lithuanian Embassy for an interview with the man reputed to be a skillful "hunter of KGB agents."

New Times. What was the start of your work like?

Balys Gajauskas. On August 23, 1991, our commission for the first time entered the KGB Vilnius headquarter on their own accord and without an armed escort. However, we couldn't start our search for the documents on that day properly, since the building was crowded with strangers and chaotic. Our main task then was to prevent destruction and theft of the documents. The KGB officers were burning documents in their offices, in the corridors, and in the restrooms at the headquarters and its branches throughout Lithuania right until their flight from the country on August 23. The same thing was happening in local KGB offices all over Lithuania. Therefore we believe that many of the KGB archives have been either destroyed or taken out of the republic. When the August putsch was in the wane, the chief KGB officer in Lithuania ordered as many of the archives as possible hidden away at local military bases. However, the most sensitive documents were channeled into Russia even before February 1990.

N.T. But do you have any important documents at your disposal nevertheless?

B.G. In my opinion the majority of the documents we have are important only historically and therefore can be published.

N.T. Do you mean to say they are old documents?

B.G. There are all kinds of them. Quite a few relate to cases of the members of the so-called "Forest Brothers" and other political convicts. There are numerous dossiers on people whom the KGB believed to be potentially dangerous to Soviet power. From

You can believe him

Balys Gajauskas – Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic. In his own words, he is a professional political prisoner. He has spent 37 of his 65 years in the chambers of the GULAG. He received his first sentence in 1948 for participation in the Lithuanian national movement. Only after 25 years was he released. In 1977, he was again sentenced under Article 68 of Lithuania's Criminal Code (which is analogous to Article 70 of the Russian Federation's Criminal Code – anti-Soviet propaganda) to 10 years in a special regime camp and 5 years in exile. He began serving his second term in Lefortovo and later was moved to Kuchino (in the Perm Region). In 1987, accompanied by guards, he was flown to the Khabarovsk Region – to the Chumikan camp on the banks of the Okhotsk Sea. In 1988, Balys was released under amnesty and returned to his native Kaunas. He is President of the Lithuanian Association of Political Prisoners and Exiles, which unites more than 130 thousand people.



B.Gajauskas (to the right) presenting an award to one of the former "Forest Brothers"

An expert opinion

Sergei Kovalyov – Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The first and last time I saw Balys Gajauskas was almost immediately after his release in 1973. I remember how astonished I was to learn that this man had spent 25 years in prison. He did not look like a hero fighting against injustice, but rather a self-controlled, quiet, modest worker who had chosen his business and did not flaunt it. As regards the activities of the commission which he heads, this is a very delicate business which relates directly to the state of the entire society. Its members tread on thin ice. The most important thing is that the principle of the presumption of innocence is not infringed upon, and that innocent people do not suffer.

In January, the KGB took action in Lithuania behind the army's back, trying not to leave any traces

certain documents it is clear that the KGB planned to use different Lithuanian developments for its own ends. Now we know for certain who conditioned the social atmosphere for provocations.

N.T. Can you be more specific?

B.G. For example, protests on the part of the Polish community and demands for an autonomy in the Vilnius area were KGB-inspired. We have a file of documents, entitled: "How the Polish issue can be used against Lithuania." Our commission plans to publish documents in the file soon.

N.T. Do you have copies of reports on the Sajudis leaders and the activity of that organization? I presume that the KGB attempted to present those people as common criminals?

B.G. I didn't come across such descriptions in the documents I've seen so far. Had any of the Sajudis leaders had a spot on his or her biography, the KGB would have used the fact to publicly accuse Sajudis of alleged connections with the criminal underworld. As a matter of fact, the KGB simply did't have any information which could compromise Sajudis leaders. Sajudis emerged as a political movement among Lithuanian intellectuals. The KGB found it an impossibly difficult task to make a university professor or an academy member look like a common criminal. However, Sajudis founders were Communist Party members – it was their only "crime," but not for the KGB.

N.T. But the KGB could infiltrate its agents into Sajudis, couldn't it?

B.G. I'm positively sure it could and did. The KGB simply couldn't ignore the existence Sajudis.

N.T. I heard a brief report in the press alleging that Mr. Landsbergis', close ally Mr Čepajtis had a 10-year career as a KGB informant, under the code name Juozas. Do you qualify this as a provocation or as a just accusation?

B.G. Even if there is documented proof of this we haven't come across it yet, simply because there are heaps of files for us to read. Therefore, I can neither substantiate the opinion nor disprove it now. We are currently working on this case, and I don't want to jump to conclusions before the work is finished. In fact we wouldn't pay particular attention to that press report, had Mr Čepajtis not displayed initiative in the matter himself.

N.T. Do you plan to publically reveal the identity of the KGB agents?

B.G. Lithuania's Supreme Soviet commissioned us to uncover the KGB agents among the deputies of the Lithuanian Parliament. A bill stripping an MP of his or her deputy's mandate because of proven record of spying for the KGB has been drafted.

N.T. Has your commission scored any successes in its work yet? Have you unearthed many moles in the Parliament?

B.G. We have just started but already have discovered certain information about certain deputies. We are going to verify the information, and if it turns out to be correct we will name names. As for the KGB agents who are not members of our parliament, we will not reveal their identity until some time in the future if ever.

N.T. What is your estimate of the number of such agents in Lithuania?

B.G. There were quite a few of them, particularly among the intellectuals.

N.T. How do you protect your information from leaking to those who would like to use it for political destruction of their opponents our just to sour the lives of people they have some personal grudge against?

B.G. I assure you that all the documents in our possession are well protected against their possible destruction or from unwarranted access, and the information contained in them will be revealed only when and if sanctioned.

N.T. What makes you so sure?

B.G. First of all, I trust my colleagues on the commission. There are nine of us, and many are former political convicts. None of us can possibly profit either politically or financially from an early publication of the documents. We are eager to do good research work first and don't seek sensations.

N.T. Nevertheless, the case of Mr Čepajtis proves the possibility of a leak.

B.G. I don't think so. The documents (and information they contain) which came into our possession after August 23 are securely protected. But other docu-

Apparently the August provocation in Medininkai was undertaken on the basis of spoken orders

ments could find their way to the press by devious ways, as happened with Mr Čepajtis. Therefore we are gravely concerned about the possibility of the use of such information as a weapon in political struggle. How are the new KGB structures going to protect or use the information from the documents which have been brought from Lithuania to Moscow and other Russian places?

N.T. What is your response to the media report about the thwarted attempt of some MPs to smuggle out some documents in the custody of your commission?

B.G. MPs are allowed to see the documents but not to carry them out. The incident you mention here was caused by misunderstanding.

N.T. Are you sure that all documents you are dealing with are genuine? Couldn't the KGB plant a dope on you?

B.G. This cannot be excluded, particularly where the agents' files are concerned. This is one more reason we don't rush and cry from the roof-tops that so-and-so is an undercover KGB agent. But if we find substantial corroboration of information we will talk the matter over with the person concerned at a confidential meeting. Many people come to us and confess their involvement. They will have nothing to fear. No one is going to use the information against them.

N.T. But what is the KGB agent actu ally? After all, the KGB has had a personal file on almost everyone in the country. Can you or I be accused of collaboration with the KGB on this basis?

B.G. Of course not. Because of the circumstance you just mentioned people shouldn't be afraid to come to us and tell us about their involvement. Incidentally, we have announced through the press that no one volunteering (before January 1, 1992) an admission of collaboration with the KGB will be held responsible for the fact by our commission.

N.T. How is the investigation of murder of the Medininkai customs officers progressing?

B.G. This case is being investigated by the Procurator's Office and I believe the investigation is nearing completion. The only survivor of the carnage, Tomas Šarunas, told the investigators important things. Now it is clear that the attack on the customs office was planned and caried out very professionally. I don't believe any documents pertaining to the operation have ever been issued. Everything was done on spoken orders.

Connected with the work of the KGB is the name of V.Čepajtis, "the second man in Lithuania" (to the right)

N.T. What about documents pertaining to the events which happened in Vilnius last January?

B.G. You'd better ask the Procurator's Office. Indeed, one of our tasks was to find documents relating to the Vilnius and the Medininkai events. We didn't find anything connected with the case of assault on the customs office, much to our regret. As for the former case, we have only the least important documents, mainly leaflets and newspaper clippings. But it is enough to deduce that the KGB was deeply involved in the preparation and implementation of the plan. However, we don't have direct evidence. I think sensitive documents are tucked away in Moscow.

N.T. Do you receive any assistance from the new leaders of the secret service?

B.G. I wouldn't call it assistance. Moscow sent us Fedoseyev whose mission got to be to help us legalize transfer of the documents into our custody. After some time we learned that Fedoseyev had been directly involved in the Vilnius events. We told Moscow about our discovery, and Fedoseyev was promptly replaced with someone else. But we can't trust his replacement either, or the new secret service in general, for that matter. The best thing Moscow can do is to return all the documents taken from Lithuania.

N.T. Your commission doesn't seem to have particularly warm relations with the new secret service authorities in Moscow, does it?

B.G. In fact, our relations are rather good in general and even warm, speaking about certain Moscow officials. We asked for files on the KGB agents in Lithuania and Lithuanian political prisoners. Moscow promised to give them to us.

N.T. Do you mean that the present secret service leaders are prepared to reveal the secret agents in Lithuania to you?

B.G. They don't see any reason why they shouldn't. At least they say so. The Lubyanka's only concern is that we don't start settling accounts with the agents. They also reason that if they give us the files they will be expected to do the same with regard to other republics, which is going to demand a much more painful decision. Moreover, the documents we want are scattered around the Soviet Union and are to be retrieved from such distant places as Siberia and the Komi Republic, besides Moscow. We have made a preliminary agreement that Lithuania will not publish the lists of the KGB agents for two or three decades to come. We ourselves wouldn't profit in any way from publishing the lists now. But with the lists in our hands we would advertise the fact and thus make the agents sever their ties with the KGB. But if some of them prefer to continue their spying, we will take them to court. Let every KGB agent in Lithuania be aware that the sword of his or her exposure is poised.

N.T. Will Lithuania have its own analogue of the KGB or CIA?

B.G. We in Lithuania are already building a national secret service. It is going to have somewhat different functions though, when compared with the former KGB. It will have headquarters elsewhere in the city, while the former KGB headquarters building will be turned into a museum.

N.T. What will be the new Lithuanian secret service's functions in regard to Russia and other republics?

B.G. The Lithuanian statesecurity department will be neither a spy agency nor a political police. However, it is going to gather information about developments in Russia and other formerly Soviet republics. Its main function will be countering anti-state activity and terrorism. There is evidence that before it left Lithuania the KGB floated around a number of highly-mobile terrorist groups. We caught one near the Byelorussian border. Its members had a radio station, weapons, and message-coding materials.

N.T. Will you demand the return of the former leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party who took refuge in Moscow following the failure of the August coup?

B.G. Yes, if their involvement in the January tragedy is proven we will demand their return for a court trial.

N.T. How does the public in Lithuania take the work of your commission?

B.G. The reaction is guarded, particularly on the part of the MPs. Nevertheless, the commission was set up by a unanimous vote in the parliament. There have been many rumours about the commission's work, just like the KGB's work used to be rumoured about in the past. But there's nothing supernatural or sensational about our work.

Alexander Chudodeyev

Six million mines

Until the year 2007 not only politicians but also leading entrepreneurs and members of synodal and industrial councils will be subject to investigation of their possible cooperation with Stasi, the state security service of the former German Democratic Republic. The statute of limitations and leniency are difficult to anticipate. If one bears in mind that roughly one fourth to one third of the citizens of the "first state of workers and peasants on German soil" were informers, then it is easy to imagine the volume of work which lies ahead of the Bundestag commission headed by Joachim Gauck. Its task is to examine the Stasi archives and files and determine their future.

The exposures, which followed the opening of the archives, were reminiscent of an avalanche. Every day the mass media exposed new victims. All this bore a striking resemblance to a witch hunt and worried many people. It is not coincidental that less and less often Germans from the ex-GDR point out those who have spied or informed. A law was passed just in time which prohibits, under threat of 3 years in prison and large fines, divulging the information from the Stasi archives and files. The people who have first access to these files are those on whom the files were compiled. Already all the others have to line up behind them, moreover, at the discretion of the commission. As justification for the step the parliament stated that it was necessary to protect the information to avoid its misuse.

But the press is up in arms claiming that this was a violation of Article 5 of the German Constitution, that again censorship was being introduced, and alleging that ever since Adenauer's time the bureaucrats have dreamt of a chance to limit the freedom of the press. Others think that either the law will be amended or the Federal Constitutional Court will simply repeal it.

The hasty passing of the law and the unanimous vote in favor of it by the parties in the ruling coalition and the opposition lead one to believe that the Bonn politicians apparently preferred to avoid any chance of future exposures. After all, who knows how many more mines are hidden in the six million files, what well-known names they may contain?

Dmitry Pogorzhelsky,
our own correspondent
BONN

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Three lessons of the Balkan tragedy

The civil war in the country is only covered with national attire. Under it is social incompatibility

How did it happen that a multinational country, which managed to resist Stalin's and Zdanov's pressure and enjoyed a reputation as the most liberal country in the socialist family, not only failed to stand the test of time, but also suffered a catastrophe much more serious than that of the Soviet Union?

First of all, this is a result of the total crisis of socialism. In fact, despite all the resolutions of the Information Bureau which excommunicated Yugoslavia from the community of nations guided by Marxism-Leninism, it remained a socialist country ruled by a Communist party which monopolized state power. It's true that Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav marxists created their own model of socialism based on the principles of self-government, collective (not state) property and controlled free thinking (which didn't prevent Tito from imprisoning his former fellow-fighter Milovan Djilas for his criticism of the system). The Party abandoned the most odious of Leninist ideas incompatible with European culture and the structure and laws of development of industrial societies. Essentially, Yugoslavia was the first to initiate what was later termed perestroika.

It was precisely the Yugoslav experience that for the first time demonstrated the impossibility of modernizing the communist system and updating a Communist party. The further some of the Yugoslav republics strayed from socialism, the less were they subject to degradation. This was first realized in Slovenia and Croatia where non-socialist or, to be more exact, anti-communist governments came to power. As for the leaders of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the high command of the Yugoslav People's Army, they remained true to the socialist option. Thus the interests of some influential groupings turned out to be linked to the preservation of socialism, while those of others were connected with its dismantling. It became increasingly difficult for these interests to coexist in the framework of a federation, since the demarcation line between them ran, although not always (which only aggravated the situation), along the borders of the republics. Essentially, the civil war in Yugoslavia is dressed in national attire which merely disguises social incompatibility.



Victor in Yukovar

Drawing from newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (Sweden)

Moscow leaders obstinately refused to see this side of the Yugoslav experience, while the opposition between the Centre and the Baltics, at least in its initial stages, had not so much a national as a social character. Mikhail Gorbachev and his circle wanted at all costs to give the "peoples' friendship" a second chance, whereas Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian leaders were heading toward private enterprise. It may be expected that Russia's accelerating the transition to a market economy will entail resistance in those republics where the party nomenclature has managed to retain power, taking advantage of the psychology of social parasitism.

There is one more important aspect of the Yugoslav experience – the ruling Communist parties have proved helpless in solving national problems. The priority of ideology over common sense and rejection of all compromises have always been the orthodox communists' salient feature. Faced with interethnic problems which didn't fit into the Marxist scheme, they preferred to ignore them so they couldn't prevent the society's marching toward the "bright future." Although Yugoslav communists were less orthodox than Soviet ones, the idea of peoples' unity was more important to them than the peoples as such. This resulted in upholding the socialist idea of a unified Yugoslavia to the detriment of ethnic interests, specific traditions and unique ways of life. Yet it's hardly possible to find another state, except possibly the former Soviet Union, which has as many variegated ethnic conditions as Yugoslavia.

In addition to this, it is also necessary to take into consideration that one of the sources of ethnic conflicts in the Federation has been and remains the difference in the level of the republics' economic development and unequal political roles played by them in the country. Slovenia's per capita gross national product is 2.5 times higher than that of Ser-

Croatian nationalists would like to preserve, but Serbs to change, the highly conventional borders between socialist republics of former Yugoslavia...

bia, 4 times higher than Macedonia's and 10 times higher than Kosovo's. Slovenia with its 10 percent of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's population yields one third of the latter's export. As neither Slovenia nor Croatia wants to share their revenue with poorer republics, the latter consider it national egoism, for, in their opinion, socialism primarily means equal participation in sharing the common weal.

On the other hand, Serbia which is not very strong economically relies on its numerical strength (Serbs constitute 36 percent of the country's population and Croats – 20 percent) and the Army in which over 80 percent of generals and officers are of Serbian descent. This is the reason why the Serbian leadership is confident that it's precisely Serbia that is capable of realizing the idea of Yugoslavia as a unitary state. Slovenian and Croatian leaders disagree, maintaining that in the present situation influence is based on economic strength and, since Serbian leadership ignores their interests, they see the only way out in "discontinuance of friendship," full sovereignty and moving in the direction of the European Community. (The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the recent confrontation between our central government and the Baltic republics.)

The mass consciousness interprets the discrepancy in the level of economical development in a simplified way: Serbs believe that Croats and Slovenes exploit them, making profit at their expense, while the latter, in their turn, are convinced that Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins are simply incapable of working as required by the present conditions.

As soon as the anticommunist hurricane swept over Eastern Europe and the ideological fetters which held the Yugoslav republics together weakened, all these problems broke out. Leaders of the Yugoslav republics, communists as well as anticommunists, found nothing better in this situation than to make use of ethnic trumps in the political struggle, which resulted in bloodshed.

Evidently, it is not by mere coincidence that Socialist Yugoslavia, shaken by ethnic conflicts since Tito's death in 1980, has found no mechanism for controlling such conflicts, indeed, has not even thought of its creation. The only instrument of settling ethnic conflicts was the Army. In principle, its use in emergencies to protect the population from the violence of extremist groups is not ruled out, but only in cases where the Army carries out the humanitarian mission of separating conflicting groups, remaining neutral. However, if it becomes an active party to a conflict, it will lead to tragedy, help consolidate nationalist emotions and bring about the polarization of forces which aggravates the situation or rules out the possibility of a compromise altogether. This is what happened in Yugoslavia. The Army which was traditionally considered the stronghold of the entire federation ceased to impersonate the idea of Yugoslavia and came to be perceived outside Serbia as a hostile force. There local forces of self-defence came into being as the material basis of the seceding republics' independence. Finally, even the Serbian government lost control over the Yugoslav People's Army which turned into an independent and, still worse, unruly political factor.

Both Yugoslavia and the former USSR,

> "If another war breaks out in Europe, it will be because of some idiocy in the Balkans."
>
> *Otto Bismarck*

Unequal economies

Republics and territories	Share in Yugoslavia's exports (in percent)	GNP per capita (in US$)	Average monthly wage (in US$)
Slovenia	29	12,520	533
Croatia	21	7,110	512
Vojvodina	8	6,790	440
Serbia	21	4,950	423
Montenegro	2	3,970	371
Bosnia & Herzegovina	14	3,590	365
Macedonia	4	3,330	300
Kosovo	1	1,520	254

From the Time magazine (USA)

and even Europe, need today effective mechanisms of settling ethnic crises. A positive role might be played here first of all by a new outlook on internationalization of critical situations. Representatives of foreign states may happen to be more fitting – neutral and objective – go-betweens for conflicting sides. Presence on the lines of tension of international peacemaking forces might deter militant impulses of conflicting groups. However, there arises the painful question of "the right to interfere" in internal affairs from outside – the problem of sovereignty. Unfortunately, this problem has not been treated by either the United Nations or by the European Conference.

Moscow has traditionally opposed all forms of interference in other countries' internal affairs, even in the framework of international peace and stability keeping forces – the leaders of the USSR were afraid of creating a precedent potentially hazardous to the interests of the nomenclature identified with interests of the nation. However, the situation which is now forming in Eastern Europe, as well as in the former Union, requires revision of traditional concepts.

Evidently, the time has come to start consultations in the framework of the European Conference or of its Centre for the Prevention of Conflict and defining criteria, procedure and forms of possible interference in extraordinary critical circumstances. Needed is also the corresponding body, something like a European Security Council which could, based on a procedure agreed upon, make decisions on behalf of the entire CSCE. Naturally this should be approved by all member countries. The new sovereign European republics, and primarily Russia – potential participants of the CSCE – will have their word to say in this respect, because they are less bound by the traditional prejudices of foreign policy practices and their initiative is less limited. However – and this is the third lesson of the Yugoslav scenario – they are not immune to such tragedies.

Yury Davydov,
professor

MOSCOW

Where is the promised prosperity?

What sovereignty has brought to Slovenia

Almost half a year has elapsed since the moment when Slovenia was "divorced" from Yugoslavia and became "absolutely independent." T-shirts with this caption, so fashionable in summer, are no longer worn. Festive illumination which lit up the sky till morning is forgotten. All champaign stored for the jubilation has been drunk. The time has come to evaluate the results of Slovenian independence.

This independence is manifested first of all in the borders which separate Slovenia not only from Western Europe, but also from former "fraternal" Yugoslav republics. New border posts and customs turnpikes were manufactured very carefully to demonstrate to the whole world how resulutely Slovenes part with their federal past. The border-crossing regime is very strict, as testified by the long lines of cars which form every day on both sides of check points. Even Slovenes living in other Yugoslav republics overnight became foreign citizens for Slovenia when the border was established. And with all ensuing consequences. For instance, my acquaintances had to pay customs duty for the wreath they wanted to lay on their relatives' tomb in Slovenia on the Day of Remembrance of the deceased. It's only logical that many Slovenes consider the latter-day border their "own tragedy." Journalists have dubbed it, smartly and caustically, the Berlin Wall's "little brother."

Slovenes have no one to blame. They themselves voted for their independence, leaving it for the republican leadership to decide whether it would be independence within or outside of Yugoslavia. The ruling coalition, Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS), has chosen the path of complete secession, promising the people that it will be much easier to run to Europe without the Yugoslav "ball and chain."

But the promises remain mere promises. It's true that realistically minded people in DEMOS warned that complications on the path to well-being were inevitable but even they failed to foresee Slovenia's present economic problems. Problems are growing like a snowball. Today the Slovenian economy's indices resemble the cardiogramme of a patient before infarction. The turnover between Slovenia and other Yugoslav republics which used to account for over one third of the republic's trade is practically at the zero level. Prices rise daily, which is explained by the fact that Slovenia has always imported a considerable amount of foodstuffs and raw materials from its neighbours, whereas today the odds and ends it manages to buy from them have become several times more expensive.

When DEMOS came to power a Slovene's average monthly salary was equivalent to about DM 1,400. Today it hardly reaches 300 and by the end of the year, according to Slovene economists' calculations, it willl fall to 200.

Slovenia's expected reorientation to the West European market is not taking place either, because, first, Slovene TV sets and refrigerators which had a good market in Yugoslavia don't sell in Western Europe for the simple reason that their quality is inferior to that of Siemens and Philips products. Second, Slovenia's cooperation with the West depends on its technological cooperation with other parts of Yugoslavia.

At first the Slovenian leadership had a good alibi – the central Yugoslav government was blamed for worsening living conditions. However, now there is no scapegoat any longer, and before long economic nostalgia, if not political, will appear in the republic.

Of course, the reason for Slovenia's present misfortunes is not its independence. Desire for sovereignty is reasonable. If it is not turned into an absolute in the latter case sovereignty becomes a neo-feudal autarchy which Europe has firmly resolved to get rid of.

It's not for nothing that the European Community of which Slovenia is so desirous to become a member calls upon the republics of former Yugoslavia not to destroy the unitary market. This stance is not obstinacy or unwillingness to allow revision of borders, but a result of reasonable economic analysis. This is why the EC is not in a hurry to recognize the new state. In a word, as the initial experience of Slovenia's independence shows, it was not so difficult to declare sovereignty. But sovereignty as such doesn't bring prosperity even to an economically developed republic.

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent
BELGRADE

We are late for privatization

comments Janusz Lewandowski, chief of the Ministry for the Transformation of Ownership

The socialist experiment, having taken ownership out of the hands of the private individual, destroyed the genetic code for this in people. They forgot how to own and bear responsibility.

The return to the natural state of being an owner and ownership is a torturous and difficult process and, as it turned out, without the participation of the government, impossible. Therefore, there came into being the Ministry of Privatization which has no precedent in history.

Privatization, right after the monetary policy, became the second pillar of the Polish reform. And the man that headed it, the minister, Janusz Lewandowski, was as high up as Leszek Balcerowicz.

Janusz Lewandowsky took the high post in the government of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki at the age of 39 in January 1991. He had taught at the University of Gdansk for ten years. In the memorable times of the birth and first victories of Solidarnosc he had been its economic advisor. After being dismissed from the university for this activity he wrote articles on economics for the underground press and worked for Baltic steamship lines. In general his life was similar to that of many who were called "Gdansk paratroopers" in Poland, comradesin-arms of Lech Walesa who made their way to the capital along with the president.

One of the ways to launch a business...

New Times. You're a man who has taken upon yourself the difficult job of resurrecting the owner in your country. I'd like to discuss with you not only privatization in Poland, but its possible future in the Soviet Union. Do you agree that privatization is just a return to the normal state of human existence?

Janusz Lewandowski. That goes without saying. It is the foundation of a market economy. It is impossible to create one without owners. The flourishing of society and the economy always go hand in hand with private ownership. However, today the process of resurrecting the owner should be based on the experience of modern highly developed capitalism. In no case should the epoch of the primitive accumulation of capital, i.e., the beginning of the 19th century, be taken as the starting point. That's crucial!

N.T. I'm just a dilettante when it comes to economics. But as I see it privatization creates problems too.

J.L. The process of privatization in part proceeds spontaneously. This is unavoidable and even a good thing because it isn't enough to denationalize and turn over state property to private ownership. It's just as necessary to encourage new private enterprises to spring up. Today there are already one million and four hundred thousand of them here – that's something!

As for the transfer of former state enterprises into private hands, it goes easiest and fastest with those that were under local government, for instance stores. A lot of capital is not needed for such transactions, it's something a home entrepreneur can afford. You can also find an owner for small factories having a few hundred employees, but only if he is sure to receive a quick and guaranteed profit. But the monsters built for fulfilling the plan and not for the market are a hard nut to crack. Many of them rapidly go bankrupt upon annulling state subsidies. After all, there is no demand for their products. And to sell them at auctions is the same as to try to sell a heap of scrap metal. Such enterprises at times are worth nothing, however lamentable this may be to the work collective, which is often thousands strong. It's very difficult to find a buyer who will agree to pay up risking all on a profit which may never be made...

N.T. In the Soviet Union it's become a tradition to speak about the six lost years of reform. The result for the economy of the country has been sad. Under the circumstances Boris Yeltsin proposes undertaking a radical reform in which the sensitive ear of the average citizen caught mainly that prices would no longer be controlled. Some specialists see such a step as a great risk in a country with a monopolized economy. What would you start with?

J.L. I'd have probably done the same. The prices will certainly skyrocket at first, it can't be avoided. It was no accident that this moment in Poland was called shock therapy. In this country the prices jumped up unbelievably high. Then they began to come down about a month and a half later. The burst of inflation in your country could be even worse considering the people are hungry and the lack of consumer goods. Probably prices for products should not be freed up all at once, those on some products should continue to be controlled in order to soften the shock of the increase in the cost of living at least a little. But that control must have a definite limit, otherwise the producer will not receive the necessary signal about the real price for his product.

In Poland normal price formation came about in a very short time, and free pricing became the two-way link between the user and the producer. That could happen to you too, but with the risk of a large-scale social upheaval. Therefore, I'd advise your reformers to be very pragmatic in deciding on which items to completely free up the prices at the given moment, and on which there should be at least partial control for a while. Moreover, so risky a measure as freeing up prices must be carried out **simultaneously** with the maximal introduction of private enterprise and wide-scale privatization. We made that mistake here. At first we freed the prices and strengthened the zloty and only a year later got down to privatization, while we should have done it simultaneously, or better yet if privatization had come ahead of normalization of price formation. Then the hyperinflation could have been overcome earlier and without such a shock.

N.T. In the Union the large industrial enterprises are to be privatized through the organization of joint-stock companies with preferences going to the work collectives. Do you think this will be effective?

J.L. In Poland, starting with 1992 there'll be an amendment to the rules of privatization of industrial enterprises. The workers will get 10% of the stock free of charge or 20% at half the price. But let's not fool ourselves: even if a fifth went to individual workers it would be difficult to imagine the collective owner. Some one person must have the motivation and will to be the concrete and enterprising owner of the given enterprise. A multiple owner isn't able to cope. Therefore we are trying to find owners with ambition and the reputation of being good businessmen. It stands to reason that they may also be the former administration of a plant (factory), provided the collective body trusts its professionalism and enterprise. In another case we are seeking a foreign buyer or some Polish private firm. An investor can be, say, a commercial bank. Incidentally, some of them are already successfully competing with the state banks: they offer more favourable terms of crediting. No matter what variant of privatization there is, you need someone active at the head of an enterprise, not a passive shareholder. The goal of the first is to develop and expand production. The goal of the second is only to receive dividends, and this is hopeless for the economy.

There is still another danger of getting carried away with workers' ownership. Neither Poland, nor the Soviet Union are underdeveloped countries. They are countries of incorrect development. Millions of people produce goods which are not needed or do useless work. It's important not so much to develop the economy as to restructure it, that is to transfer capital and labour into the vital spheres of production. The workers having become co-owners of their factory will be ready to fight for it, as they say, to their last breath, even if its insolvency is evident. In such cases, when the collective of an unprofitable enterprise take a deaf stand, which is quite often here, arguing is useless...

N.T. Privatization brings about not only economic, but deep social transformations: a middle class forms, and in its turn it creates the conditions for a stable and dynamically developing soc-

Position and approximate salary in Poland

General Director of a large company or foreign firm	20–30 million zloty
Director of a medium-sized foreign firm	11 million zloty
Director of a Cegielski factory (largest machine building enterprise in Poland)	8.5 million zloty
President of the Republic of Poland	8.4 million zloty
Leading partner of a commercial firm	5.0 million zloty
Journalist	3.2 million zloty
Captain of Wojsko Polskie	3.0 million zloty
University professor	2.5 million zloty
Candidate judge	2.4 million zloty
District police inspector	2.2 million zloty
Beginning customs official	1.8 million zloty
Worker who makes Venetian blinds at a private firm	2.0 million zloty
Teller at the Great Poland Credit Bank	1.5 million zloty
Doctor-psychiatrist at the second level of specialization	1.5 million zloty
Teacher with twelve years of service	1.3 million zloty
Actor in a theatre (10 years' experience)	1.1 million zloty
Janitor at a publishing company	1.1 million zloty
Catholic priest who teaches the catechism	1.0 million zloty
Young teacher	900 thousand zloty
Sales clerk at a butcher's shop	800–900 thousand zloty
Musician in a philharmonic orchestra	700 thousand zloty
Worker at the mechanical plant in Ostrzeszov	650 thousand zloty
Wife of the family bread-winner, called to military service	635 thousand zloty

Last June the minimum monthly wage in Poland was 663 thousand zloty, about 57 dollars. At the time the official exchange rate was: 11,630 zloty = US$1.

From the Wprost magazine (Poland)

iety. What motives, advantages and stimuli, in short what means of encouragement and protection are there for people who venture to run their own business, taking fate into their own hands?

J.L. This is a very serious question. The entrepreneur is the foundation and driving force of a healthy economy. It's not enough for him to get the space to apply himself to. He also needs an atmosphere of respect and approval of his labour, something that won't happen soon here or in your country. It's hard to convince people that a businessman is first of all a person who stakes his capital, his well-being, and that his risk is incomparable to the risk of a worker who in the worst instance only loses his salary. Secondly he creates new jobs. And thirdly he increases not only his own wealth, but the wealth of the whole society. So far, unfortunately, we see mostly envy at and hatred for businessmen, not respect. In any country, the number of people who are prone to innovations and willing to take a risk is very small. The state must protect such people in all possible ways. In the former socialist world enterprising people were always kept an eye on and disdained, and shunted off to the sidelines. Our home-bred businessmen either concealed their incomes or had to invest their money in the shadow economy. As long as the entrepreneur is called a speculator, a market will not form...

The Polish capitalist is just being born. He owns not a metallurgic plant, but a small factory. According to the law on privatization, he must make a down payment of 40% of the cost of the enterprise, the remainder he may pay in installments over 4 years. This is a primary form of credit, since neither here nor in your country is there a sound credit and banking system like in the West.

If there is to be collective ownership of the enterprise, then the down payment of each private individual from outside is not 40% but 20%, and the following payments will be at a lower interest rate.

N.T. So far in Poland the most successful businessmen are clearly merchants and not industrialists...

J.L. That's perfectly normal. Trade is a sphere where capital accumulates fast and the opportunities here are vast, for Poland is a country with an insufficiently developed service infrastructure. In time the capital obtained in trade will permit its owners to make serious investments in industry. To this day inflation and high interest rates curb the desire to invest money in production which also doesn't promise such quick returns as trade. But let people make their fortunes where they can as long as they don't break any laws. Let their capital grow in any sphere of products or services if these products and services are in demand. No society ever prospered where people branded and persecuted one another. Agree, enterprising people are the driving force for all the rest who prefer not to take risks and sit it out.

N.T. By the time this comes out in our magazine Poland will evidently already have formed a new government. Do you allow for the possibility that all reforms initiated so far will be annulled by the new leaders?

J.L. That's entirely possible. The disgruntled voters, and there are quite a few of them, may put pressure on the government and force it to change the strategy of the economic transformation. But I hope that in this case the Poles will be saved by their instinct of self-preservation and won't destroy what has been achieved with such difficulty.

***

The Polish reform was not a catastrophic loss of time. It was not aggravated by the leaden weight of a state farm system: 86% of the land was in the hands of private farmers. And it does not matter that the majority of farms were small-scale ones and far from the level of development in the West, no ear of corn nor potato went to waste. Moreover, the mass psychology of the Poles more or less remained that of a private owner. Therefore a middle class formed quite rapidly, though it is not as large as it should be yet. It supports the political centre and is a guarantee of the stability of society. It is made up of prosperous farmers, independent tradesmen, entrepreneurs, traders, bankers, stock brokers, scientists and people in the arts, and some of the highly qualified workers (i.e. those whom Lenin disdainfully castigated as the workers' aristocracy).

I think only the following generation may fully appreciate the significance of Balcerowicz's reform. If for no other reason, than among this generation there are a lot of its victims. With the noticeable growth of the private sector there has been a decline in the industrial production in the state sector. Unemployment – mainly due to the liquidation of unprofitable large industrial enterprises putting out worthless goods, and, as it turned out, (note!) self-enlistment of the lumpen mass, those who never worked and don't intend to, into the ranks of the unemployed – reached the two-million mark. The programmes for social protection and preservation of culture and education lag behind. Not all is going smoothly with the restructurizing, modernization and revival of agriculture. There's a lot of bankrupts there.

Yet, the gains outweigh the losses. The more so, since the majority of the losses were those natural for growth. One gets the impression that the muscle spasms have slackened and the energy acquired is changing the surrounding world before our very eyes.

Rudolf Borecki,
our own correspondent

WARSAW

Stuck in the jungles



The two superpowers almost simultaneoulsy decided to reconcile themselves with their former enemies. The USA is ready to cooperate with Vietnam, while in Moscow they sat down at the negotiating table with the mojahedin. And in both instances the first question was the fate of the POWs

Irina Lagunina

On the 21st of November 1990, George Atkinson, chief of the Missing Persons Division, US Department of the Air Force, sent a letter to the retired Colonel V.J.Donahue:

"We are in receit of three classified documents that were originated by the Central Intellegence Agency (CIA) which have been associated with your son – Major Vincent J.Donahue (...). The CIA declined release of sanitized copies of these documents to you... However, they have asked that we advise you of your right to appeal their decision..."

Colonel Donahue appealed the CIA's decision and finally received the documents about his son who was declared missing in action in Vietnam. One of them went as follows:

The source said: "I have information about 2 dead military people in Laos – MacAdams and Cleve. I have photocopies of their dog tags. The first is a marine, and the second is in the national guard (Chicago). I also have information about one live prisoner (Donahue) and another five others unknown. This is very urgents because my friends in Laos are afraid. The live prisoners will be killed or moved... I do not have and cannot get the real dog tags from the dead soldiers. My friend who had them was killed – by someone who wanted them for money. Only he knew where the bodies were. Perhaps he told someone. April 20, 1987."

POWs in exchange for dollars

Recently the CIA declassified some of the documents touching on the fate of hundreds of Americans missing in action during World War II, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. For the most part they contain information as to where, when and under what circumstances the American prisoners were last seen alive.

In spite of the fact that Vietnam never acknowledged that it had taken any American POWs or even simply prisoners (Hanoi asserted that all of them were war criminals), in March 1973, after the American army left the country, the government returned 561 prisoners to the USA. In America this act was called the "Operation Homecoming". President Nixon promised to give Vietnam 3 million dollars to help rebuild the country in return. But the Senate didn't ratify the President's proposal. On the list of MIAs were 1678 names and it was necessary to first clear up each of their fates, and then give the money. Thus began the litigation going on for more than 15 years.

Washington promised to help Hanoi in exchange for the return of the POWs or the remains of the dead. Hanoi asserted than it had neither the capability nor the money to conduct a search for the remains, and there hadn't been any POWs for a long time. In the end the USA introduced a trade and economic embargo which not only cut Vietnam off from American business, but also from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. That could be endured while the Soviet Union handed out a billion of dollars a year to Vietnam. But in 1990 when this sum was reduced by 60 percent, and then even more, the Hanoi government became less sure of itself.

In the USA there were few, besides the Senators, at first who knew that not all POWs had returned in 1973 and that there were more MIAs. The US Department of Defence and the USSR Ministry of Defence shied away from the theme of prisoners of war in the 1980s...

One of the activists for freeing the American prisoners in Vietnam on the board of directors of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, Michael Van Atta, said that in the 1980s he thought that all American prisoners had come home. But he found out that the military intelligence had 351 accounts of people seeing (as of August 1981) American prisoners in Vietnam and Laos after the end of the war! The veterans, no longer believing the government, decided to look into the matter themselves.



Американский летчик Лунс Хрдлика, сбитый над Лаосом, в плену (верхний). Воинская карточка американского пилота Роберта Фрэнка, самолет которого был сбит патриотами (с

The photos above were published in *Pravda* of August 31, 1966. Where have the GIs whose photocopied papers were produced by the correspondent gone? And where is David Louis Hrdlicka who had been reported captured by "patriots"? They are still listed in the USA as "missing in action."

By July 1989 the number of statements supposedly came to 1210. About 200 of them were made by Vietnamese who hoped to get American citizenship and thus gain easy entry into America. Some of the soldiers, it turned out, had already arrived home. And there were those who had married and decided to remain in Vietnam. But 119 statements deserved attention.

So a campaign to free the POWs began in the USA.

Why had the CIA remained silent?

"The American and Vietnamese governments," said Van Atta, "couldn't bring themselves to sit down at the negotiating table. The White House sent General John Vessey to Vietnam with a group of experts. But he could not offer Vietnam anything – neither economic assistance nor diplomatic acknowledgement.

The veterans and the families of the MIAs in Vietnam even turned to the Soviet government with a request to put pressure on Vietnam to release all the soldiers. Last year a delegation of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition held negotiations in Moscow at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Moscow got in touch with Hanoi and within a couple of months the remains of two Americans were sent from Vietnam to the States. Maybe that was coincidental...

Finally the US Senate took up the problem of the POWs. There was even a special commission set up to investigate the matter. Below is an excerpt from the report of one its experts, Tracy Usry. Usry thinks that the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency didn't declassify important data on the prisoners on purpose and says the following:

"One very good example to show how the Defense Department excludes information that is contrary to their analysis is the case of Navy pilot LCDR James E. Dooley. It illustrates very well my previous comment about intelligence analysts disregarding new information. Dooley is listed as Killed in Action. Body not recovered by the Defense Intelligence Agency, however, private researchers believe he was taken prisoner in North Vietnam. Dooley was not returned or accounted for during Operation Homecoming in 1973. Dooley was shot down October 22, 1967 while on a bombing run near Hanoi, flying an A-4E aircraft. He crashed south of Don Son, Haiphong province, North Vietnam. Limited observation by fellow pilots, weather and the swiftness of the incident may have led to some confusion over whether or not Dooley survived the crash. In 1973, a returning US POW claimed he saw Dooley's name written on the wall in a prison cell in Hanoi; two Thai special forces soldiers also released by the North Vietnamese in 1973, identified Dooley's photograph as that of a person who was in prison with them.



The CIA and DIA knew about this, but Dooley's name was not taken off the list of the dead and put on that of the MIAs.

This report was prepared in February 1991. Maybe, having studied it, the US Senate will take a softer position rather than that (no help nor acknowledgement until there is information on all the prisoners) it sticks to.

The American government is ready for this now. True, now the American veterans and families of the MIAs don't know whether to be glad or sorry. Secretary of State James Baker made American-Vietnam relations dependent on the settlement of the Cambodian crisis, though he stressed that problem number one was the prisoners, as before. The negotiations between the USA and Vietnam to take place at the end of November should clarify the situation. If not, the Vietnam veterans can again do something like they did at the end of the 1980s – they came to the White House on their motorcycles from all over the country and waved black flags and demanded that the president do something to free their comrades-in-arms.

Where have the GIs gone?

Actually, it'll be easier now for the US to come to terms with Vietnam. Before the problem of the prisoners depended only on politics, but now it is connected more and more with the economy. In spite of the fact that Vietnam opened its economy for Southern Korea's and Japan's investments, it needs American assistance since it no longer receives any from the Soviet Union.

It'll be even more difficult to come to terms with two other countries – the USSR and China.

In May 1989 China acknowledged that its troops fought in Vietnam during the American-Vietnamese war. More than 300,000 Chinese soldiers defended Hanoi and 4000 of them died. And a month before that the Soviet mass media unexpectedly announced that not only the Afghan veterans should be helped, but the Soviet veterans of Vietnam war as well.

In the documents recently declassified by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency there are accounts of Soviet and Chinese military specialists debriefing American prisoners, mainly pilots and soldiers with technical training. For example, there are the lines from a report of a CIA agent working at a superphosphates plant in the province of Vinh Phu. The plant was built by Soviet specialists in 1963. But by 1965 only 4 or 5 Soviets remained there. In 1965 the number of foreigners at the plant was augmented by 20 Chinese. They usually conducted the interrogations of American pilots in one of the plant's buildings.

"Two US pilots were taken to the debreifing point on one occasion in 1965, eight, in 1966; and an unknown number, in 1967" the agent reported. "Upon their arrival at the plant, the guards lined up forming a corridor through which the pilots entered the building. At this point a Soviet, a Chinese and a Vietnamese greeted the pilots and led them into the building. The pilots usually remained in the building for several hours."

The agent didn't know were the prisoners were taken then.

The Soviet newspapers of those years might give analogous information replete with photos. Moscow, as well as Hanoi, used the American prisoners as proof that the USA was fighting in Vietnam and Laos. Now the papers are both evidence and a valuable source of information. *Pravda* in 1966 told of David Louis Hrdlicka who was shot down on his fligth from Danang (South Vietnam) over Lao village named Samneua. Hrdlicka is listed as missing in action to this day.

Usually after being debriefed by the Soviet and Chinese, the prisoners disappeared. Where to? Moscow and Beijing have been silent about this so far. Maybe the secret will be revealed by Vietnam which is interested in dollars now.

■

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AVIS

The army must serve the state, not politicians

For many years the army controlled Spain's political and economic life. What is the army's place in the democratic state's structures now?

Senator **Rafael Estrella PEDROLA,** the Spanish representative in the NATO subcommittee for disarmament, answers questions from *New Times* correspondent **Yury SIGOV**

New Times. With what did the democratization of the Spanish army after decades of the Franco dictatorship begin?

Rafael Estrella Pedrola. The army is to defend the country, not engage in politics. Clemenceau used to say that the military should not be allowed to interfere in politics: politics is too serious for that. When they came to power in Spain, Socialists declared that the armed forces would obey the orders of any popularly elected government. Rigid restrictions were imposed on the military's political activities and participation in political parties.

N.T. During the August putsch in Moscow the army received the order to enter the city from its legitimate commanders, in particular the defence minister and the vice-president of the country. What were the troops to do: carry out the order and fight the people, or refuse to obey thus breaking their pledge of allegiance?

R.E.P. One must make a distinction between the legitimately and popularly elected power and the scoundrels who usurped that power. The order is the basis of military service. If it does not obey orders, any army stops being an army, in however democratic state it might exist. But only people who enjoy people's trust have the right to give orders to the army.

N.T. There have been energetic demands in the Soviet Union that the defence ministry be headed by a civilian, as a guarantee of society's control over the army. What is your attitude to the problem?

R.E.P. A civilian heading the defence ministry has more opportunities to establish closer links between the army and society. In Spain, for instance, the office of defence minister has been occupied by a civilian, Mr Narcis Serra, an economist by education and the former alcalde (mayor) of the city of Barcelona, since 1982. Naturally, he does not go into all purely military problems, but he has good advisors and his being a civilian allows him to occupy an independent position when it comes to very many problems important for the army, including the problem of arms cut.

From the viewpoint of democratic principles, a civilian can be more successful in running the defence ministry. But if in your country the defence ministry has been for years headed by generals, and if you want to break this tradition, you should approach the problem cautiously and without haste.

N.T. Do you think there is any danger that the Spanish army may get dissatisfied with its isolation from politics, stage another coup and come to power?

R.E.P. In principle, such fears may be justified, as was demonstrated by the aborted coup of reactionary officers in 1981. However, in such cases everything depends on the relations between the army commanders and the state leadership. The Spanish army is rather conservative, but at the same time it is traditionally loyal to the popularly elected government. That is why Spanish generals are highly unlikely to attempt a coup d'état.

As far as I know, there are fears in the USSR that the army's isolation from political processes and the aggravating economic situation may breed displeasure among the military and result in one more coup. I do not think most Soviet officers and enlisted men are really so eager to "play politics." I think what they want is to serve normally for the benefit of their country. Usually, it is a small group of generals that plays politics, and in the event of a coup d'état, such generals can receive unlimited powers.

Besides, after the August coup the Soviet Union is going to reduce its armed forces personnel including top officers. The main thing here is to avoid excesses. After the civilian government took over in Spain, dozens of generals and senior officers known for their pro-Franco attitudes were discharged. However, they were treated well, received good pensions and nobody humiliated them. That is why they did not stir any trouble leaving the army.

N.T. The prestige of the military profession has declined in the Soviet Union recently: officers are not paid very well. How much do you think a career officer should be paid?

R.E.P. A Spanish officer earns about as much as a university lecturer, while a general's pay is comparable to that of a Senator. Spanish privates and sergeants do not earn much, but the state provides everything necessary for them free of charge. Families of Spanish officers do not have very high incomes. Naturally, businessmen make more money. However, the military profession is highly prestigeous and this prestige is defined not by the income, but by the state's attitude to officers on active duty. When one joins the army, one must feel that the state is interested in one's service.

MADRID

Budapest, 1956. Col.Gen. Malinin (wearing colonel's uniform) on his way to arrest Nagy

Operation Whirlwind

Valery Musatov

New Times divulges for the first time the price of crushing the Hungarian revolution of 1956: 669 Soviet men and officers were killed, 1,450 wounded, and 51 were reported missing

The question of how and what decisions were taken in the Kremlin before and during the Budapest revolt in 1956 remains unanswered. Soviet historians do not yet have access to all archives. An attempt by a group of Moscow scholars to make an objective analysis of Soviet-Hungarian relations at that time was brushed aside by the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) last spring. Nevertheless, the documents, evidence and recollections of eye-witnesses are sufficient to give a rather truthful, though not complete picture of the events.

Rakosi forced to resign

Judging from the available information, at the initial stage of developments in Hungary in the spring and summer of 1956 the leadership of the Soviet Union, where the 20th CPSU Congress had just been held, seemed to understand the need for changes. At the time Moscow was more concerned about the events in Poland – the downfall of the Bierut regime and the return of Gomulka. Nevertheless, the "Stalin old guard" and the military wing in the CPSU Central Committee were perturbed by alarming reports from Budapest about the growth of anti-government sentiment and criticism of the leadership of the Hungarian Working People's Party (HWPP). In June 1956, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee sent Mikhail Suslov on a mission to Hungary. He naturally saw there what he wanted to see or what the Hungarian leaders wanted to show him. As a result, Suslov gave the following account: "The sentiments of workers, peasants, especially cooperated peasants, can be described as sound. Among workers and peasants as well as in local branches there is no talk about a 'crisis' in the party leadership or mistrust of it." He expressed an opinion that the removal of Rakosi from the post of First Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party would be "a present to the Americans." At the same time Suslov thought that there were too many "persons of non-Hungarian nationality" in the HWPP Politburo. He also met with Janos Kadar then and stated that after prison (to which Kadar was sent by Rakosi and his team) he did not bear a grudge against the people's democratic system and produced a good impression. What did Kadar think about that? I know definitely that he felt enmity towards Suslov until the last days of his life.

But contrary to Suslov's assertions the erosion of the command-style system of administration and government continued in Hungary. The name of Rakosi aroused general hatred. It is apparently for this reason that exactly a month after Suslov's trip Anastas Mikoyan was sent to Hungary on a mission. Mikoyan drew opposite conclusions: the country was in a deep crisis, power was gradually slipping from the hands of the HWPP leaders, "hostile elements acting vigorously, resolutely and confidently were forming a parallel centre."

Mikoyan concluded that Rakosi was chiefly to blame for the crisis. Though Hungarian leaders did not tell the Moscow emissary about the need to replace Rakosi, he formed the impression that they were bound by the view presented earlier by Suslov on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee and would like the Moscow guest to effect an unpleasant personnel change. When Mikoyan asked at a closed meeting in Budapest whether it would be better in the party's interests if Rakosi himself resigned to save the situation and neutralize the opposition, those present breathed a sigh of relief, and Ernö Gerö was elected First Secretary, though contrary to Mikoyan's opinion in this case.

Since Gerö was known as a loyal advocate of Rakosi's policy, his election did not ease the tension. On the contrary, the crisis worsened. After mass actions of protest on October 23, 1956, Gerö was forced to quit his post and Imre Nagy took the reins of government.

Imre Nagy and Moscow

The Soviet leaders of that time knew Imre Nagy rather well because of his work in the Communist International and in postwar years. Incidentally, in 1933 he became an NKVD informer (several Soviet documents about his role in this capacity have been published in Hungary). Services of this kind were then regarded as almost an honoured internationalist duty. It is possible that Nagy could not simply tear himself away from the NKVD's hands. Rumours about the information supplied by him to Lubyanka circulated among Hungarian Communists living in emigration. True, in 1938 one of the Soviet state security departments arrested Imre Nagy by mistake. But four days later he was released at the request of the department with which he collaborated. Malenkov knew about this aspect of Nagy's activity since 1940. Relevant documents were sent him by Beria's lieutenant Merkulov. In 1985, I heard from Janos Kadar that Nagy was "Beria's man."

Nevertheless, after Stalin's death Nagy, then premier, began to champion genuine independence for Hungary. His views were very popular among ordinary Hungarians. However, they stirred up hatred among "hardline Stalinists" – Rakosi and his associates. These hardliners convinced Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders that Nagy pursued a "revisionist policy" and played up to nationalists. He was ultimately removed from the post of premier and expelled from the party. But Nagy's "Kremlin friends" continued to regard him as a possible instrument in their political game, and their soliciting evidently did not allow Rakosi to take harsher measures against the disgraced premier.

This explains why the Kremlin's initial reaction to Nagy's return to power was rather positive. Moscow seemed originally to be prepared to give its backing to Nagy, though it did not trust him fully. However, it had such good intentions for several days only.

Words and deeds of the CPSU

Most likely the CPSU leadership understood the need to analyse the essence of developments in neighbouring countries. In 1956, the CPSU Presidium (Politburo) stated for the first time that it favoured the equality of friendly socialist nations and non-interference in their affairs. At its four meetings the Presidium considered the situation in the countries of people's democracy. It discussed new principles of relations, the withdrawal of a part of Soviet troops, and the reduction of the number of Soviet advisors in the government bodies as well as in the state security committees and interior ministries of these countries.

On October 24, 1956, these questions were discussed at a CPSU Presidium meeting with the participation of leaders of foreign parties. The meeting was attended by members of the Presidium (Bulganin, Kaganovich, Kirichenko, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, Brezhnev, Shvernik, Furtseva, Shepilov, Pospelov and Khrushchev) as well as by Ulbricht and Grotewohl of the German Democratic Republic, Zhivkov of Bulgaria, and Novotny of Czechoslovakia. Later they were joined by Liu Shaoqi, then Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Soviet Defence Minister Zhukov and Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to China. Suslov and Mikoyan were not present at the meeting because both of them were again in Budapest.

On October 30, 1956, the Soviet government made public its declaration on principles of the development and further consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and other socialist states. The government reviewed in a self-critical manner the postwar experience of building relations with these countries and ex-

A barricade crushed by Soviet troops

pressed its readiness to free them of deformations. However, the seeds of what is now called new political thinking could not take root then. The events in Hungary fell upon the Soviet leadership like an avalanche and, as a result, its good intentions were dispelled instantly. The Stalinist great-power tradition prevailed. From all the information received in Moscow the class instinct and party expediency selected only the anti-socialist one. The determination of the opponents of the Rakosi regime to bring about changes therefore triggered an impulsive reaction in Moscow.

It is for this reason that Moscow played a double game. The declaration of the Soviet government proclaimed non-interference in the domestic affairs of friendly countries. At the same time Marshal Zhukov was charged with the task of preparing measures in connection with the events in Hungary. Incidentally, both documents were approved by one and the same meeting of the CPSU Presidium, though they were dated October 30 and 31, 1956. In fact, the Soviet Defence Ministry and the General Staff began planning a military operation as early as October 27.



Khrushchev and Mikoyan: no policy differences

Kadar and Suslov: unwilling partners

There were no two lines

Some Hungarian and Western historians believe that the fate of Hungary was decided in the struggle between two lines. Molotov and Suslov advocated the use of force while Khrushchev and Mikoyan tried to find modus vivendi with the Nagy government. Differences in the approaches did exist, but they were not essential.

There were certain hesitations in the reports of Suslov and Mikoyan from Budapest at the end of October. On the one hand, they insisted on rejecting all demands of the Hungarian opposition and revolutionary committees and on solving problems with the help of tanks. On the other hand, they said that if such an approach were taken the Hungarian authorities might lose public trust. There would be more victims and an ultimate breakup. After a meeting with Imre Nagy they seemed to agree with his intention to include more prominent democrats and representatives of former petty bourgeois parties in the government. Simultaneously they stressed that it was a "slippery" path.

Nagy's statement about his intention to raise the question of withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary made the high Kremlin emissaries indignant. At an earlier meeting with the leadership of the Hungarian Working People's Party they warned that it would mean the entry of American troops. Incidentally, a similar thesis was repeated during the August 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. It was also stated then that the entry of Warsaw Treaty troops averted the possible invasion of American and West German troops.

By all indications, Mikoyan was displeased with Nagy because he informed the Soviet emissaries of his government's decisions post-factum. At the same time, he understood the difficult position of Nagy and his government. He reported to Moscow that the Hungarian leader was in poor health, that he had had several heart attacks. Once Mikoyan and Suslov even gave Nagy heart pills.

Suslov and Mikoyan leave Budapest, Khrushchev and Malenkov visit Tito

On October 30, Suslov and Mikoyan reported to the Kremlin that the situation in Budapest and the country was deteriorating. The leading bodies of the party were unable to conduct their work and party organizations were disintegrating. Hooligans became impudent. They were seizing district party committee offices and killing Communists. Voluntary public order squads from among party members were being organized too slowly. Factories came to a standstill. People were staying home. Railways did not run. Students and other rebels changed their tactics and displayed great activity...

The high Moscow guests reported that they had not yet made a final decision. Nevertheless, they recommended sending Marshal Konev to Hungary without delay.

One can only guess what final conclusions were drawn by the emissaries of the CPSU Central Committee. It is not clear whether they were recorded or conveyed on the telephone. On October 31, Mikoyan and Suslov left Budapest for Moscow. It looked like a recall. Other forces were brought into action. Later on Hungarian affairs were tackled by Malenkov, Aristov, Suslov and Brezhnev. Khrushchev was going to visit Kadar, but he went to Hungary only in 1957. Mikoyan paid another visit to Hungary only in the spring of 1965.

As for Marshal Konev, by that time he had been appointed commander of Operation Whirlwind, a code-name for the invasion of Hungary. On November 1, he began to regroup troops, move in reinforcements and surround airfields.

After the Hungarian government's statement on the withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country the fate of Hungary and Nagy was decided. The aggression of Israel, Britain and France against Egypt, which began on October 29, 1956, created a favourable background for Soviet action. The hands of Western powers were tied by the Middle East crisis, and the Kremlin thought that in such a situation it could act without looking back at the West.

The Kremlin's stand was also influenced by the extremist actions of some

opponents of the regime, such as a raid on the Budapest party committee building and the execution of Communists and state security officials. Pressure was exerted by a group of former Hungarian leaders residing in Moscow. Gerö, Revai and Hegedüs took part in the drafting of the first documents of a future government to be led by Kadar. Rakosi hoped to return to Hungary. This became evident from his subsequent letters to Khrushchev.

Evidently the behaviour of the Soviet leadership was also influenced by the Yugoslav syndrome. The relations between Moscow and Belgrade had been restored by that time. However, the dispute over the canonical Soviet model of socialism and the Yugoslav way of building socialism continued. Tito did not conceal his liking for Imre Nagy. But the Yugoslav leadership was worried about the continuing bloodshed and it was prepared to take independent action, including the use of force.

On November 2 and 3, 1956, Khrushchev and Malenkov secretly visited Tito on the Brijoni Island to discuss the Hungarian problem and coordinate plans. They reached an agreement with regard to Kadar. Earlier, Soviet leaders met in Bucharest with leaders of other socialist countries. The Chinese marked time, believing that "not so much blood had been shed" and the socialist countries could therefore wait a little. But later Liu Shaoqi, on behalf of Mao Zedong, announced Beijing's consent to military action. Romania volunteered to participate, but Khrushchev was wise enough to decline the offer in order to avoid an interethnic conflict.

The trip of Khrushchev and Malenkov to the Brijoni Island was not reported in the press. It is noteworthy that when Western diplomats noticed the absence of Khrushchev in Moscow Bulganin replied to their questions that "boss" was at home.

The revolt is crushed

On November 4, at 6:15 a.m., Marshal Konev ordered Soviet troops to start fulfilling the request of the Kadar government that had been formed by that time. The troops had to "help break down the resistance of the rebels in Budapest and restore lawful power and public order in the country." A special corps stationed in Hungary, consisting of three divisions and commanded by Gen. Lashchenko, began its operations a little earlier. In addition to the corps, two armies consisting of nine divisions took part in Operation Whirlwind. Airborne units had also been moved to Hungary. A total of 60,000 Soviet troops stayed in Hungary in November.

They had been ordered to put out and disarm units of the Hungarian army. With a rare exception, Hungarian units did not offer organized resistance. However, Soviet troops had to wage fierce battles against rebels in Budapest. According to Hungarian data cited also in Soviet documents, up to 4,000 Hungarian citizens died in the fighting.

Soviet troops also paid a considerable price for the "victory": 669 men and officers were killed, 1,450 wounded and 51 were reported missing. These figures – the gruesome outcome of great-power policy – are published for the first time.

Arrests began throughout the country. Pal Maleter, Defence Minister in the Nagy government, was seized on the night of November 4, during his talks with Soviet general Malinin. By November 15, Soviet security bodies had arrested 1,372 people and transferred them to the Hungarian Interior Ministry.

Kadar once told Gorbachev that when the number of death sentences had reached the number of victims among supporters of the ruling regime he asked the judicial bodies and the Interior Ministry to stop further persecutions. It is difficult to say now whether it was indeed so and how Kadar's request influenced the course of events.

Much remains unclear with regard to the trial of Nagy and his supporters. At first, there was not even talk of staging a trial. But later, in the course of ideological discussions in Communist parties, there arose the question of who bore the responsibility for the events. It was stated that Nagy opened the way to counterrevolution. Members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (the successor of the HWPP) were gradually reconciled to the idea of bringing Nagy to trial. Under the pressure of conservative forces inside the country and the leaders of "fraternal countries" the HSWP Central Committee adopted a decision on instituting legal proceedings against Nagy and simultaneously asked Moscow to keep Rakosi as long as possible in the Soviet Union. Rakosi was kept until 1971, though he was a burden for Moscow. He died in Nizhny Novgorod.

Imre Nagy did not plead guilty and stood firm. It seems, however, that some of his associates did not behave properly.

During the trial the Hungarian authorities consulted with Moscow. Now and then Soviet emissaries arrived with documents of the investigation. The available information indicates that KGB experts took part in preparing the trial. According to eye-witnesses, Khrushchev was conscious of a possible international reaction and advised Hungarian authorities to treat the defendants more mildly. It seems that the final decision was passed by a narrow circle of leaders in Budapest, though documentary evidence of hidden circumstances of the trial did not remain. Imre Nagy was executed.

Kadar's stick and carrot policy

The lawfulness of the Soviet decision to send troops to Hungary and of the actions taken by Kadar and his associates was considered an axiom for many years. Only five years ago, in 1986, these events were observed in Hungary under the pretext of "defence and renewal of socialism." True, Kadar said that an appraisal of the 1956 events should be made by historians. In any case, it was a tragedy of the Hungarian people. Properly speaking, the Hungarian society was divided in 1956. Many years passed before it was finally admitted that the revolt was directed against the Stalinist system and totalitarian rule. The rebels fought for the freedom and independence of their country.

Nevertheless, it can be said that Hungary was lucky to have Janos Kadar. Using the stick and carrot policy and many of Nagy's proposals, his government was able to stabilize rather quickly the internal situation and win public confidence. Though Kadar did not have much free hand at first, he was able to pursue an independent course even in the post-Stalinist period thanks to his sovereign thinking and charisma. Hungary gained the reputation of a country of reforms and liberal order. However, the defects of even a modernized but essentially Stalinist system did not enable the Hungarians to bring about a genuine regeneration of their society. The system, the party and the aging leader degraded gradually. One can only be glad that the epoch of "real socialism" ended peacefully in Hungary.

In the Soviet Union, the armed intervention against Hungary in 1956 put an end to the thaw began after the 20th CPSU Congress and suspended de-Stalinization. The logic of great-power thinking of 1956 was repeated almost completely unchanged in 1968, when the Prague Spring was crushed. The only lesson drawn by Brezhnev from the Hungarian events consisted in the words said by him at a meeting of leaders of socialist countries on August 18, 1968: "The troops must fulfil military tasks. We should not repeat what was done in Hungary: arrest people and then decide what to do with them – shoot or pardon."

Photos from Der Spiegel (FRG)

HUMAN RIGHTS

The "Authority" in the Kurgan camp

Labour Camp No.6 in the Kurgan Region is believed to be a relatively calm place with no more than four to five crimes being committed in one year. It is a maximum security camp where repeaters are kept. One cannot say that the camp administrators were especially enthusiastic about accepting the delegation of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee which included a *NT* Correspondent: their major concern at the moment was the threat of a strike. Criminal offenders circulated leaflets in the camp threatening anyone who dared go out to work.

Repeat offender or stock broker?

Nevertheless, a meeting with the convicts was arranged for us. Each of them had a chance to voice his own considerations about the reform of the penitentiary system and improving the living conditions in the camp. About thirty men assembled for the meeting at which the subject of the coming strike was naturally mentioned. The convicts were divided over the issue. Suddenly, an elderly heavy-set man rose to speak.

"We're listening, Mark Mikhailovich," said the camp chief with a note of respect in his voice. It was the first time that I heard a camp chief address a convict by name and patronimic. Everybody stopped talking. It became evident that the man enjoyed absolute authority in the camp. However, he did not look like an "underworld king" or a "bitch" (the one who sells himself to the camp administration and runs the Discipline and Order Section), whom all convicts despise. Besides, there was the name...

After he had served four terms the chief of the camp started addressing him in a respectful manner...

Mark Sherman: after 10 years behind bars

Mark Mikhailovich laid waste to the idea of a general strike. He was brief and to the point: the criminal legislation could not be corrected by means of a strike; a wave of unrest was already sweeping the camp system and it was enough to attract the Supreme Soviet's attention; any unrest in the camp would trigger retaliation on the part of the camp administration which is as interested in changes as the convicts themselves...

The next day the whole camp went out to work.

We met and spent a long time talking after the meeting. Mark Mikhailovich Sherman, 58, has spent almost half of his life in prison. The most recent sentence was fifteen years and confiscation of all property. He has served out ten years already. He is not a murderer or rapist or malicious hooligan. Mark Mikhailovich was a trading mediator, or broker. That is why he was sentenced. He has managed to retain his integrity and fortitude despite years behind bars and cancer sufferings. He only admits that he is too tired – after all he has seen 19 prisons and labour camps. Sherman gave me the manuscript of his memoirs. Part of that manuscript has already been published in the Novosibirsk-based economic journal *Eko*.

...In 1938 he was sent to the Lefortovo Maximum Security Prison along with his mother as "the son of a German spy and enemy of the people." He landed in prison once again when he had just turned sixteen. That time a special note was made in the sentence that he had already been convicted under Article 58 (Treason to the Motherland). Finally, he was sent to prison in 1970 for four years for commercial activities and in 1981 for fourteen years with

NT note

Article 88. Violation of Hard Currency Operations Rules.

Article 92. Theft of State or Public Property.

Article 93-1. Theft on an Extremely Large Scale.

Article 152-1. Padding of Work-Sheets and Other Distortions in Accounts.

Article 153. Private Enterprise and Commercial Mediation.

Article 154. Black Marketing

Article 170. Abuse of Office.

Article 173-174. Taking or Accepting a Bribe.

Article 175. Forgery of Service Documents.

confiscation of all property for theft on an extremely large scale. One more year was added to the term after he was already convicted.

Mark Sherman & Co

20.09.91
attn. Chief of OF–73/6

You are hereby instructed to convey to convict Mark Mikhailovich Sherman that his appeal forwarded to us by the Russian Charity Foundation has been considered. The criminal charges against convict Sherman have been considered by the USSR Procurator's Office.

Convict Sherman's responsibility for theft of state and public funds on an extremely large scale has been definitely proven...

Convict Sherman's protests that he was engaged in commercial mediation and not theft have been found invalid and contrary to the evidence available.

There are no reasons whatsoever to bring in protest against his sentence, to reformulate the charges against him or to weaken the punishment.

Signed: Deputy Procurator General of the USSR, State Legal Counsel of the First Degree Ya.E.Dzenitis.

...In the late 1970s a fire at the Novo-Yeniseysky timber-works destroyed a warehouse and some other

Cases of prison unrest are common

Disabled prisoners: debating the proposed strike

A cook can well end up in a boiling soup if found guilty of cheating

Photo by O.Melnik

facilities. A large profit-making enterprise was crippled. There appeared the need for people who could rescue the situation with immediate supplies. Sherman was invited to participate in the effort together with other competent people. Mark Mikhailovich was seen as a private entrepreneur then – as a first-grade invalid he was not officially employed by any organization.

Sherman was hunting for goods, materials, contractors, manufacturers. He helped establish direct contacts between interested sides. Moreover, all barter (at that time the word was still alien to Soviet economy) was conducted with low-grade timber and surplus raw materials which would have been left out to rot anyway. In exchange for low-grade timber Sherman organized the supplies of pipes and metal from Chelyabinsk, polyethilene and electric fixtures from Kurgan. He exchanged twenty wagonfulls of shaped timber to be used for repairs of railway cars for soft rolled wire produced in Magnitogorsk. "Everybody was happy. Everybody stood to gain. There was no bribing," he recalls. On October 26, 1980 Politburo member Kirilenko visited the Magnitogorsk plant and noted the Sherman initiative as "deserving attention." He also recommended that enterprises establish and maintain direct economic contacts.

Naturally, the Party and Soviet organizations were aware of Sherman's operations and some Party secretaries even tried to be helpful. The trouble started looming in March of 1981 when one of Sherman's patrons, First Secretary of the Kustanay Regional Party Committee Borodin who had been in charge of the region's economy for over twenty five years prior to his appointment as First Secretary, was demoted from his position. His successor was a new broom: several enterprise directors and heads of sovkhozes were arrested and convicted. Sherman's turn came soon, too. He was arrested in Kurgan at the end of April. The investigators started to make the case against him and look for accomplices. As a result, 16 directors of sovkhozes, 16 chief accountants, 32 superintendants, and many cashiers, economists, warehouse chiefs, etc., were also arrested.

The Kustanay case started getting out of control, threatening to develop into a national corruption scandal. Finally, the regional party leadership ordered that all suspects be released and Sherman alone be convicted.

The investigation effort was at its peak when the six months of the specified by the law preliminary detention term expired. Mark Mikhailovich had to remain in the preliminary detention ward for two more months before he was released on signing a pledge not to leave town. He was already very ill.

He spent one and a half years in freedom which was wholly devoted to treatment and underwent 38 surgical operations. In May of 1983 Sherman was detained once again. There was a trial at which Sherman was sentenced to a long term in a labour camp for "deceiving directors of enterprises and conspiring to derive illegal profit..." Sherman himself addmitted to having appropriated 12,000 rubles," the sentence noted. The sentence failed to make it clear though, that in actual fact Sherman recived that money as a fee for mediation. All he got was 545 rubles a month for 22 months of hard work with no vacations or days off.

The Sherman arrest evoked a great response in the press. Even before the trial the newspaper *Sovetskoye Zauralye* carried a lampoon entitled "The Crash Of Mark Sherman & Co." "It is difficult to imagine today how agricultural builders in the Kustanay, Turgay and Kurgan regions managed without the enterprising and energetic Sherman," the newspaper wrote sarcastically. Meanwhile, the Novo-Yeniseysky timber-works issued a certificate confirming that the economic effect from Sherman's effort exceeded two million rubles. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes, however, were too intimidated to put in a word for him, although their profit from some of the Sherman-mediated deals also ran into tens of millions of rubles.

Sherman is seriously getting ready for release – he is reading the press and corresponding with business partners. His son is a broker at the Kustanay Stock Exchange. He has the starting capital and ideas and the right connections. Sherman says he will build two meat-packing plants in Kurgan in the course of two to three months ("We could purchase the equipment in Germany and the personnel will be no more than five people.") and start the production of furniture.

Amnesty?

There is some hope for Mark Sherman's being released soon: The Amnesty and Pardoning Commission under the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan is looking into his case. What is going to happen to the dozens of thousands of people convicted for economic (which are now not considered as such) who are now serving their terms throughout Russia?

The question of a sweeping amnesty for people convicted for economic felonies was not born yesterday. The authors of the "500-day Programme" believed that such an amnesty was necessary. "Do not people in the Supreme Soviet understand that it is impossible to move towards a free market explicitly mistrusting those very people who engaged in business before it was allowed?" wondered Sherman's neighbours and "colleagues" to whom I talked in the camp.

Boris Yeltsin has submitted to parliament a bill on court reform which stipulates the abolition of several Criminal Code articles including two "economic" articles: Article 152 (padding of work sheets) and Article 152 (private enterprise and mediation). However, during my trip to the Kurgan Region I did not meet a single person convicted under these articles. Experts say that explanation is simple: it was unprofitable for the state to convict people under these two articles because the maximum punishment they carried was five years, and even less for mediation. That is why the local Party authorities usually instructed the courts to sentence lage shadow economy dealers of the Brezhnev time under Articles 193-1 (theft on an extremely large scale) or 173-174 (offering or accepting a bribe) which carried up to fifteen years with confiscation of all property and, in some cases, capital punishment...

Naturally, neither theft, not bribe is an economic felony and the possible amnesty will hardly have any influence on the fate of the people convicted under these articles.

The Society for the Defence of Economic Freedoms and Amnesty for People Convicted for Entrepreneural Activities has been working in Moscow since last year. Its chairman, Victor Sokirko, is convinced that it is insufficient just to omit the Economic Felonies section from the Criminal Code. It is also necessary to release all people convicted under Articles 88, 152-1 – 154 and to review the cases under Articles 92, 93-1, 170, 173-175. As long as this is not done, people who were this country's first private entrepreneurs will stay out in the Gulag cold.

Oleg Vishnyakov

KURGAN–MOSCOW

Its books sell like hot cakes

The Russki Yazyk Publishing House claims to be entered in the Guinness Book of Records

A ceremony to mark the publication of the first volume of the 20-volume dictionary of the modern Russian literary language and of the French-Russian dictionary for active use took place recently in the Rossiya Cinema and Concert Hall in Moscow. Vladimir Nazarov, director-general of the Publishing House, is interviewed by a *New Times* reporter.

New Times. Russki Yazyk Publishers will soon observe the 18th anniversary of its founding. Are you able to compete with numerous commercial publishing houses emerging?

Vladimir Nazarov. We have a niche of our own. Russki Yazyk is a unique house. It publishes literature for all who study both Russian and foreign languages. The house has on its staff first-class editors: specialists in Russian philology, stylists, methodologists and lexicographers. Every year it puts out books of over 200 titles in a total edition of about ten million copies. I think we could take a worthy place in the Guinness Book of Records. At least no other publishing house in the world has been able to bring out dictionaries in 75 languages. Among the latest publications I would like to note the Hebrew– and the Gipsy–Russian dictionaries. Our specialists are now working on the dictionary of such a rare language as Icelandic. Besides, we are actively publishing a series of dictionaries of English for active use and German for active use.

Not long ago we began to put out foreign editions, such as the dictionary of American idioms and the dictionary of American slang. In the first quarter of 1992 an English dictionary of mass media will be available. I think it is a very interesting publication.

V.N. Will you manage to publish it?...

N.T. I can well understand your doubts. There is always a run on our dictionaries. Besides, the publishing of our books has been reduced substantially of late because of the paper shortage. As a result, they are sold on the black market at prices four, five or even ten times higher than the official one. It's a pity, of course.

N.T. Russki Yazyk puts out not only dictionaries but textbooks as well.

V.N. Our textbooks on the Russian language are highly valued by specialists all over the world. They are used at universities and colleges in the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain. For foreigners who study Russian we put out sets of manuals in large editions: *Russian for everyone*, *Tempo*, *Russian for independent study*, and *Stage*. Not long ago we decided to prepare and put out several school textbooks jointly with our American colleagues. The first publication of this kind is entitled *Face to Face*. It is to appear next year. One more new publication is *The Family's Album*. It is a manual for the popular TV English language course of the Berlitz school.

Lastly, we do not forget about our little readers. The Publishing House is organizing the publication of comic strips, which are increasingly winning the Soviet market.

N.T. Aren't you going to open your own shop?

V.N. Such a shop will be empty most of the time because it will simply have nothing to sell. As a rule, our books are sold out within several hours.

If your boss is a brute...

How to treat people who drive us mad

Every fifth person in the world is ill, the World Health Organization reported recently. L. Ron Hubbard, the American writer and researcher, had named this lamentable figure a quarter of a century ago.

Not being ill himself, Hubbard was certain that the expansion of the public health system was just a waste of taxpayers' money. New and evermore potent medicinal preparations, Hubbard maintained, only created the illusion of a cure. People swallow pills and capsules in ever larger quantities, but overuse of medicines destroys the body faster than some illnesses do.

So what are we to do about it? Shall we keep fit? Give up smoking and drinking?

What makes us unhealthy

Hubbard never stooped to suggesting trivial solutions to health problems. All he could be reproached for was extravagance. He arrived at the conclusion that most ailments were caused by living in the company of anti-social types whose only aim in life was to harass those around them. Those were no mysterious demons but ordinary people often described as "a nuisance."

They delight in spreading bad news, in insulting and humiliating people, in making their lives miserable. The sufferings they cause actually make people ill: after all, many diseases are of psychosomatic origin. In other words, a man falls ill not because his system has undergone pathological changes, but because his nervous system breaks down upon contact with the outside world.

If you withdrew such people from your world, Hubbard wrote, you would feel greatly relieved. The ability to identify them could change your life radically.

But how are we to get away from the people capable of making us miserable and ill?

Just take a look around: what kind of people can unsettle you for the rest of the day? The answer is: those classified by social psychologists as **aggressors.**

A great deal of books have been written about such people. The portrait drawn by American scientists looks familiar...

They are always ready with insults, they are despotic, arrogant, they oppress you. They simply disdain those who surround them, regard them as inferior beings which deserve only to be insulted and humiliated. The aggressors often succeed in climbing quite high up the social ladder. Their likely rivals' embarrassment, confusion and impotent rage pave the aggressors' way to the top.

They always know what others should do and how they should do it. Their conviction that they have the right to dictate to others stems from their ability to make mincemeat of anyone trying to resist them. They value aggressiveness and self-assurance only, and have no respect for those who lack these qualities. They assert themselves by humiliating others.

How to counterattack

What can you pit against such a person?

To begin with, you should be able to stand up for yourself when dealing with such an aggressive person. If you allow an aggressor to subdue you, you simply cease to exist as far as he is concerned. He will mark you down as someone not to be reckoned with, American social psychologists tell us.

If your boss or your senior colleague shouts at you, give him a chance to let off steam. When the attack begins to peter out, it is your turn to speak. Do not wait for him to fall silent, though, because when he does, it may already be too late. Screw up your courage and interrupt him, and then take the initiative. Your speech should not necessarily be smooth, don't worry about that. The aggressor does not expect you to assume the counterattack. Show him you are not scared. Any trick will do. The most important thing is to confuse him, to make him stop shouting, to blunt the edge of his fury, and to get down to brass tacks.

Drawing from Time magazine (USA)

Never try to rival the aggressor in his element by trying to outshout him. Do not get involved in a battle, the worldly-wise Americans warn. By his very nature, an aggressor just cannot surrender. He will only build up pressure. The odds are against you because he is a professional and you, a mere amateur.

If you win this skirmish by some miracle, you will lose the war anyway. A defeat does not reform an aggressor. On the contrary, his hatred for you will intensify, and he will become twice as dangerous.

Being able to stand up for yourself is quite enough. Upon coming up against calm but resolute resistance, a surprised aggressor may even come to respect you. And this is quite enough.

People who are covertly hostile to you and whom Robert Bremson, the American specialist in the management sphere, calls **snipers** are no less dangerous.

The snipers shoot from "nests." Their weapons are hints, caustic remarks, provocations and carefully camouflaged insults. The target of their attacks feels, more often than not, utterly unprotected and is afraid to kick up a row over what others may regard as an innocent joke. A sniper is convinced that most of his victims prefer to avoid direct confrontation, that they will swallow all the insults, pretend that nothing has happened, and even stupidly share in their tormentor's mirth.

A sniper has his own idea of doing things properly, he is convinced that his boss is a dullard, and his colleagues – incompetents. If his ideas are rejected, he takes out his vexation on colleagues.

Like any aggressive person, a sniper is a bad loser. He insists on being regarded as the kingpin of the group, even if he is not the boss. An aggressor feels it is safe to shout at others because he is their chief. A sniper realizes that it is silly, to say the least, to insult those who are in power. "If I trip you, hold you up to ridicule, and demonstrate for all to see that you cannot cope with difficult situations, I shall assert my superiority over you," is the sniper's logic, and he puts it to good use. If he suddenly makes it to a higher rung of the office hierarchy, he starts shouting at his recent colleagues, and smoothly changes over to the class of open aggressors.

"Smoke him out of his hole"

Social psychologists say that the best way to fight a sniper is to smoke him out of his "pillbox." Do not let him attack you on the sly. Ask him the following direct question, preferably in public: "Is that remark of yours meant as a taunt?" In this case, a sniper usually tries to "run astern," using a nautical term: "Oh, no, you've got me wrong!" By making the sniper eat his words, as a matter of fact, you have shown him that you should be left alone.

Never give in to a sniper's charges, Robert Bremson says. If a sniper remarks with a grin: "Not much of a conference, is it?" never show any signs of embarrassment. Instead, ask those present whether any of them share this view. If no one agrees with him, the sniper has had it. If most of the other conference participants are also displeased with the way the conference has been organized, then you have only yourself to blame, and your critic is not a sniper but a good worker.

It is unpleasant to witness any of your colleagues coming under a sniper's fire. A well-wishing and decent person will intervene immediately. Experts recommend thinking twice before taking such a risk.

Some people are prepared to tolerate insults from someone superior to them intellectually or someone more temperamental and more lively than they are, especially if they depend on him in some way. However, they hate the idea of a third party witnessing their humiliation. If that happens, they come to bear a grudge against the witness, rather than against the nuisance.

Under the circumstances, the sniper may be more aggressive than usual. In the end, you will find yourself between the devil and the deep blue sea. If your inborn notions of honour prevent you from standing idly by, step in and speak your mind quietly and to the point, without undue emotion. See that you don't get involved in the conflict. And never try to talk the sniper and his target into patching up their quarrel.

With children, it's easier

The snipers are not the only ones who sent your blood pressure up. Ill-tempered types can also be quite annoying. They cannot keep their emotions in check and are like children who use fits of anger as a means of putting themselves on an equal footing with adults. A weakling uses a gun to get what he wants, and a child bursts out crying to get his mother to buy him an icecream cone, for instance.

For adults, petulance is a means of making up for their helplessness.

In the case of an unrestrained person, a display of temper is almost an automatic reaction to the wrecking of his plans and to the possible consequences. The object of such a person's anger cannot understand what has infuriated him.

One should always be on the alert when dealing with such an explosive individual. Unless promptly put down, an outburst may well become personal. In that case it will be much more difficult to bring relations back to normal.

Therefore, never talk back to an irritable person, American specialists say. Try to understand his motives for attacking you, even if this is the last thing you'd want to do at the moment.

It is easier to deal with children, of course, but how is an adult to be calmed down?

To begin with, try to "put out the fire." Keep perfectly calm, and do something quite opposite to what you are expected to do (this is a universal method of dealing with the people who annoy you). For instance, you may suddenly jump to your feet (or sit down) and exclaim: "Yes, that's it, you are quite right!" If that catches his attention, you should take the initiative, by saying loudly: "I see that this question interests you as much as it does me. Let us discuss it but may I remark, to start with, that..."

If there is no stopping the man, cut the session short or just say "I'll be right back" and leave the room. The explosive man should be allowed time to restore self-control.

Be careful, though. If it's only a matter of a difference in tempers, see that you don't mistake overemotional persons for aggressors or snipers. What if your eager opponent means business while you are only preoccupied with observing propriety and maintaining your own authority?

Leonid Mlechin

In the next issue: what makes people difficult to deal with, and what causes us to suffer. L. Ron Hubbard's version.

Help yourselves to a cup of sewage!

The Russian-American ecological centre is going to drag Russia out of a poisonous rubbish pit

Earthkind is the official name of the Russian-American non-governmental ecological organization, founded on November 15. It is somewhat difficult to interpret this name – either our kindness to the earth is meant, or the earth's kindness to us. Probably both interpretations are correct, since it's a question of Russia's ecological rescue: let us be kind to the earth which is so kind to us.

An American delegation arrived in Moscow to sign the agreement about opening the organization's centre. Rutskoi and Hasbulatov sent telegrams of greeting, blessing Russian and American ecologists' activity aimed at rescuing our natural environment.

The Americans arrived with serious intentions.

"Mind you, there will be no investments in the economy of a country which is in such a catastrophic ecological state as yours!" declared one of them.

Russia's Supreme Soviet's attitude to the new organization was apprehensive, although all expenses for its organization were assumed by Russia's private entrepreneurs, such as the company Interoko and others. The apprehensive attitude was easy to explain – sanitation of the environment will require allocations while there is no money to buy foodstuffs.

American delegates attended a session of the Supreme Soviet. They didn't ask questions, they simply put on the table a small box, inserted a metal rod into it and suggested connecting it to some electric appliance.

I have seen the startling performance of this contraption. Deputy Director for Conservation and Renewable Energy of the company "Pennsylvania Energy," Daniel J.Desmond, put it in front of me in his suite in the hotel Moskva and plugged a fan to it. The fan started operating at full capacity. The device consisted of a set of plates firmly fixed together with screws. Small holes were visible in the black plates to let the air in. As Desmond explained to me, a new kind of electrolysistook place inside the box, in which the main role is played by hydrogen and the waste is pure vapour.

"This power generator will revolutionize the world's energy industry," said Desmond. "Yes, this is practically a *perpetuum mobile*. At least its energy will be enough for your lifetime and mine. It generates electrical energy without polluting the environment at all. There will be no need to burn coal or oil, no need for car engines which pollute air, or for atomic power stations. Of course, oil and coal-mining companies will be displeased, but it's a question of saving the natural environment.

Russia's Supreme Soviet burst into applause when it learned that the generator was going to be extremely cheap. The Americans left the miraculous appliance as a present for Russia's parliament.

I was present at the inauguration of the Earthkind Centre. One of our scientists said in his speech that a couple of decades ago America looked as littered and untidy as Russia does today. Yet they managed to tidy it up, and now the United States is a comely country with a healthy and prosperous environment.

I expressed my doubts: I couldn't believe that America was as polluted in the 1960s and 1970s as Russia is in 1991. Many are already sick and tired of our self-criticisms and demand that an end be put to self-humiliation. However, Americans traditionally are much more critical of themselves than we are.

"It's no more than your impression that America is so clean," a member of the delegation Judi Friedman told me. "On the surface everything looks very tidy. But essentially it's like sweeping the rubbish under the sofa. Practically every family in the United States pollutes the atmosphere with "sprays" of various kinds and purposes – from hair-spray to insecticides. Their use must be banned all over the world. This is a terrible enemy of the atmosphere and causes holes in the ozone layer..."

I heard something about it, but still used sprays like that to kill flies in the summer. Nobody has as yet raised the question in our country, and the shelves of our shops are filled with "sprays" as compensation for the absence of everything else.

"Something else concerns us, too," added Lou Friedman, President of the company Peaceful Ecology in Connecticut. "The use of poisonous chemicals in agriculture is banned in the United States. Producers sell this merchandise to Latin America where it is widely used, and then we import poisoned fruits. Now we are excited by the prospect of the Soviet Union becoming a tremendous market for the USA. I am afraid that these poisonous chemicals for agriculture, properly advertised, will sell to your country. Business is business."

"And what kind of business can you have here?" I asked.

"We don't think much about this aspect of the affair. Well, maybe, we'll sell you ecological equipment. However, our principal mission is that of charity. After all, protection of the environment is our common cause, and the situation in your country is

very poor in this regard. We have visited a plant in Zaporozhie. We managed to get inside through a back entrance, ignoring its "show-piece" premises which might be offered for us to see, or the clean cabinets of the administration. I'll tell you frankly: we got into a real Hell of Dante's. We couldn't have even supposed that such things were possible. Not only is the atmosphere destroyed, but the workers are literally killed by poisonous gases.

This is unthinkable in the United States, because in our country laws are enforced which encourage those plant-owners who take care of the environment. If the owner of a metallurgic plant spends liberally on purification systems, smoke-catchers and the like, he gets considerable privileges, including taxation ones; in other words, it has been possible to turn ecological concerns into a profitable business. We understand that your country has more important problems. It should be expected, however, that your parliament will in the long run adopt the corresponding laws. And if we turn back to that plant in Zaporozhie, it must be stated that it is cheaper not to damage people's health than to pay their sick-leave."

One more miracle was shown to me by the Americans – another small appliance which consisted of a finger-thick curved glittering tube with some headpieces attached to it.

"This is a filter which cleans water even of radioactive particles," explained Desmond.

"I heard that we use such systems in our space-ships and submarines."

"Yes, precisely – systems. They are terribly cumbersome, extremely complicated and cost a lot of money. And this one is practically the same, but it is much cheaper and more compact. We also have conversion – formerly this filter was used only by the military. Recently we visited Kyrghystan and told local people about the filter. It was near a hospital, so we connected it to the sewage and pure water began to pour forth. A Kirghizian representative said as if by way of joke, "Well, you won't drink this water, especially when it comes from a hospital." To tell you the truth, I had never done it before, but I took a glass, filled it with water and drank. Then my colleague did the same, and only then did the Kirghizian representative follow suit. As you can see, so far we are alive and kicking..."

Earthkind has two co-chairmen – Jan Hartki of the American side and Vyacheslav Sluzhivov of Russia. When I asked Sluzhivov on the eve of the inauguration of the centre what the American ecologists were going to do in our country, he said:

"Rescue Russia from the poisonous rubbish pit."

I understood it in a somewhat literal sense. I remembered my coming back from Helsinki on a train which rolled on noiselessly and smoothly amidst clean meadows, cultivated fields and luxurious villages with modern supermarkets. Crossing the border was a shock. One week was enough to forget our habitual ways. The train began rumbling and staggering like a drunkard. Beyond the windows there was an endless dump, a rubbish-pit called Russia. I looked at half-ruined village cottages drowned in litter and rubbish and thought that if every villager had put in order the patch of land around his house, the entire street would have been clean. Certainly, one can sit ear-deep in dirt and invent those to blame: incompetent leaders, Jews, democrats – anyone, rather than recognize one's own faults. And the fault, it seems, lies with all of us, since we have all contributed to Russia's degradation. Therefore, the fish rush to alien shores and the beasts flee to Scandinavia across the border.

Our American friends are not Russia's sanitary brigade. They have come to help us, so that we might have air to breathe and water to drink. But as concerns the dirt around our own house, it's for us to clean it up.

Dmitry Zgersky
Drawing by the author

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FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

One of the authors of *Vekhi* (1909), probably Sergei Bulgakov, noted that the radical intelligentsia movements showed little interest in the nationalities problem. This was a just remark which by no means applies only to the radicals.

Meanwhile, the "ethnic provinces" of the empire awakened, and the entire set of societal problems there took the form of nationalities problems. And the farther the peoples of the empire progressed towards developing their national cultures and an awareness of their uniqueness, the stronger grew their desire for self-determination. The general democratic movement sometimes simply tried to avoid emphasizing "nationality" so as not to provoke the reaction which already took "anticipatory action" in the form of the "imperial" political philosophy, Great Russian chauvinism, and ethnic traditionalism on the "outskirts".

The defeat of the democratic forces in the October revolution also dealt a blow to the moderate patriotic forces on the "outskirts" of the empire. In addition, the intellectual elite – both the Russian and that which stemmed from the national movements of the people – was crushed under the iron heel of those in power. A "union of minds," sought by the representatives of the democratic movement, never developed.

In this sense, the suppression of the Russian intelligentsia by the new leadership had special significance. This intelligentsia was the most sympathetic part of Russian society and was ready to cooperate with the intellectual elite of the other peoples of the empire. However, this does not include those rebellious radicals who were subjected to harsh criticism in *Vekhi*. M.A. Slavinsky's article from the collection *The Intelligentsia in Russia* (1910) is important in this regard. The collection was prepared by a group of representatives of the party of constitutional democrats. This article, "The Russian intelligentsia and the nationalities question," is of great interest even today (although it bears the stamp of the idealization of the intelligentsia, its humanity among other things).

A union of minds, a union of nations

M. Slavinsky

Our times are marked by a virtual explosion of national and nationalistic feelings in all the ethnic communities of the Russian Empire.

Ethnic movements of all varieties and hues are fermenting and maturing all over the northern, western and southern provinces of the state with a population of tens of millions, large enough to accommodate several European kingdoms. Over the past few years this part of the Empire, which is the closest to Europe territorially and culturally, has become a laboratory of sorts in which all kinds of ethnic and nationalistic experiments are staged – fortunate and unfortunate, hazardous and safe, and in any case fraught with certain natural and inevitable consequences.

In the extreme north, a stone's throw away from the Imperial capital, there is Finland whose well-balanced evolution has been almost totally independent, until quite recently, of the overall state of affairs in the Empire. Today this province, the most Europeanized of all, has been drawn into the all-Empire round of events and is now going through a hard period of intense concentration of national forces.

The western outpost of the Empire is inhabited by the Polish people, Russia's only major nation which has a long record of state independence and statehood in the European sense of the word...

In the west and, again, in close proximity to the imperial capital there lies a string of relatively small ethnic groups which have awakened from an age-old slumber almost under our very eyes to embark upon an intense effort towards national renascence. The revival of those nations will long remain an example – the most instructive one, perhaps – of the might of national spirit which dies only with the physical demise of the nation, its creator and its bearer. The German orders tried to denationalize Estonians and Latvians for ages, but all their efforts proved futile; the same goes for the Poles' efforts to deprive Lithuanians and Byelorussians of their national character.

The south of Russia is inhabited by the Ukrainians whose national movement is at the stage of fruitful contacts and creative exchanges between the intelligentsia and the popular masses; hence its extensive character. The near future will see the transition of this movement from the extensive stage to that of intensive effort.

Also found in those outlying districts are people who make up a national entity although they have neither a land of their own, nor the peasantry which is the basis of any nation. I have in mind the Jews. The Jews add a distinctive hue to the colourful spectrum of national movements.

It is not only the European provinces of the Empire that are an arena of national movements. The complicated ethnic pattern of the Caucasus remains largely mysterious and undefinable. The outlook for ethnic relations within it, and for its future in general, is unpredictable. As mysterious is the Empire's Moslem east – a motley belt of nations stretching from north to south. Held together by a common religious culture, these nations seek to turn the region's ethnic conglomerate into an organic whole. Further east, there are blurred outlines of Siberian ethnic groups still in their formative stages as nations.

The national movements that swept all the outlying provinces of the Empire could not but affect its core, the Russian people and its intelligentsia. We have witnessed the rise of numerous right-wing nationalist organizations like the Russian People's Union, the All-Russian National Union, and so on. The political centre – the October and other public groups close to it which haven't issued a clear-cut political manifesto yet – are inspired now by purely national, now by crudely nationalistic feelings... Nor does the political left wing refrain from a rather vivid manifestation of national feelings, and in some cases like the well-known polemic over the "national identity" or in the recent dispute over the role and character of the intelligentsia, it shows obvious signs of nationalist fervour.

Russia is going through a difficult period which never repeats

itself – the initial stage of the change-over to a new statehood, with all the parts of the imperial system of government and the system itself being replaced...

History knows of cases when reforms were carried out by their formidable opponents: in France, the Third Republic was established not only by the Republicans; in our own country, the reform of 1861 was effected by those who had not put it in the political and social order of the day. Such a method of implementing reforms certainly entails most undesirable consequences such as delays in deciding matters, vacillation, excessive compromises not necessitated by the attendant circumstances, confusion, uncertainty about the future, and sometimes downright distortions of the principles and objectives of the reform.

The record of the Duma of the third convocation is a fine illustration of that. Compelled by the force of things to carry out reforms and to establish a new system of government in the country, but feeling no organic need for that, the Third Duma grudgingly enacted fundamental laws steeped in the sins of unprincipledness, vagueness, inconsistency and hesitation; laws which are pregnant with every conceivable political and social conflict; laws which are only a prologue to further frictions and to open struggle. Nevertheless, the Third Duma is doing – even though inefficiently and slowly – what any representative institution would do in Russia at this historical juncture: it is changing our system of government.

Reform requires first of all goodwill of the nationalities and, the main thing, comprehension of these nationalities, common interest by their intelligentsia

In mono-national states, a new system of government is born under normal conditions; the duration and intensity of "delivery," figuratively speaking, depend on the political and social structure of the state in question, on the alignment of public forces of which this or that form of the new system is the result... In a mono-national state, national movement does not transcend the limits of cultural and historical objectives and, being a concern of the whole nation rather than that of an individual class or social stratum, is never a point of political or social issue, a matter that can be argued over and agreed upon...

A multi-national state is something else again. In such states normal ethnic relations are a rare and happy exception. The opposite appears to be true: ethnic interests colour, and sometimes dominate the country's political scene, invading even those spheres which seem to have nothing to do with the ethnic factor, such as the economic and social ones. This is especially true of countries like Russia where most nationalities live side-by-side with one another on the same territory; where else, except in Russia's north- and south-western provinces, is the social pattern of the population also its ethnic pattern.

In multi-national states, "nation" is a political term which is not identical in meaning with "nationality," which is a cultural and historical entity. In mono-national states this contradiction is settled *ipso facto,* and in multi-national ones the settlement requires a prolonged and intense political effort, skillful statesmanship and, the main thing, goodwill of the nationalities comprising the given nation. This goodwill is crucial not only to progress in political and other spheres, but also to the well-being of multinational states.

In the days of the so-called emancipation period when each and all expressed their pent-up wishes, their cherished dreams and aspirations frankly and fearlessly like children, and when all the nationalities gave voice to everything they wished to say, no nationality expressed even a shade of resentment for state unity. The congresses of autonomists-federalists, of smaller ethnic groups, of schoolteachers' and other organizations of national minorities, the latter's papers and political parties, declared their support for state unity and for placing this unity on a new and stronger foundation.

The subsequent developments, which are still going on, have dashed these hopes to the ground but failed to shake the Empire's nationalities' faith in unity.

The demands so emphatically expressed by the people of Russia in the liberation period have been as emphatically turned down by now. Having relapsed into its traditional policy towards national minorities, the Empire is actually encouraging the centrifugal tendencies within it. Repulsion has been elevated to a principle of ethnic relations but the forces which have made the Russian state a single whole possess the force of attraction which prevents non-Russian nationalities from breaking away and accepting the ideas of political separatism. These forces are Russian culture and its chief product, the Russian intelligentsia.

Is the Russian intelligentsia national?

Even a cursory analysis of the interrelations between nationality and the intelligentsia will show the utter absurdity of this question because a nation is worthy of the name, in its modern sense, only if the formation of the intelligentsia in its midst has become an accomplished fact. Whatever definition is offered for the phenomenon of the intelligentsia, its members are distinguished by the high standard of their intellectual development. In addition, the intelligentsia is the only social group which, being more or less independent of the influence of class and professional mentality, concentrates all the distinguishing features of national genius, assimilates the best of what the nation can offer and then returns this "investment" with interest as products of its creative effort, bypassing all the class and professional barriers. The intelligentsia has not only created all the non-material values in the given nation's cultural circulation, but is continuously disseminating them; without it, the progress of the given nation's civilization is unthinkable. The intelligentsia guards all the elements of its nation's culture. Its cultural standard determines that of the given nation, its sympathies and attitudes

mirror those of the people's, it refines the best traits of the national character to perfection. Finally, the national language, the chief element of national culture, is always at its best as used by the intelligentsia in any period of the nation's history. The intelligentsia is also a kind of intellectual laboratory which creates not only purely cultural values but also forms and types of the national civil and political system. The intelligentsia has the key to the national destiny of the people of which it is a part.

The Russian intelligentsia has always discharged its national functions brilliantly. Its history is a long and uninterrupted record of service to the people. Within a relatively brief period and in the most unfavourable conditions, the Russian intelligentsia has reared and fostered great literature, great science and great art which have secured for the Russian people a fitting place among the world's nations. Instead of encouraging it, the country's governments have gone all out to alienate it from the people; nevertheless, the Russian intelligentsia has contributed enormously to the people's enlightenment and conveyed to the people national ideals enriched and tested by other national cultures of the world. Deprived of any chance to take an active part in public life, the intelligentsia influenced and largely "civilized" the country's public by force of its moral authority. Separated from politics by a "Chinese wall," oppressed, humiliated and denied civil rights, always living in danger of punishment and vengeance, the Russian intlelligentsia has preserved its creative political thought and created, entirely on its own, lofty political ideals. Its concentrated impact was strong enough to influence all the doctrines, including even socialism (recall the "narodnik" movement) and the extreme forms of anarchism (Bakunin) which seemed to be incompatible with the Russian national spirit. The Russian intelligentsia has always gravitated towards the people and the latter, in its turn, has had an enormous influence on it. Historical precedents apart, we have seen Russian political parties, particularly the extreme left ones, change their theoretically well-balanced social programmes beyond recognition under the influence of social unrest in any, even its crudest, forms.

The Russian intelligentsia possesses another quality which distinguishes it sharply from the educated communities of the leading nations of other multi-national states. I mean a more or less complete neutralization of nationalist tendencies in it. This has not always been the case. In the first quarter of the 19th century, the Russian intelligentsia was nationalistic and largely remained such until the middle of the last century. Pestel and Pushkin differed little from Nicholas I, and old Slavophiles from their contemporary government in that respect. It has only been since the mid-19th century, as the progressive intelligentsia came into conflict with the conservative government over ways to improve the nation's state system, that the Russian intelligentsia has begun to shed the threadbare garbs of aggressive nationalism. The Russian intelligentsia is by no means to blame for the horrors of the national depersonalization which has been in progress for the past fifty years in the Russian state. It has washed its hands of the imperial lethnic policy and cushioned its blows by lofty humane compassion trying, as best it could, to freshen the stifling atmosphere created in the country by imperial ethnic policy.

The relatively high standard of Russian culture and the noble image of the Russian intelligentsia had a most important role to play in winning the support of the country's non-Russian peoples for the idea of state unity. All of them, except the Poles, Germans and Finns, who have always been entirely foreign to us ethnically and culturally, began their renascence under the absolute influence of Russian culture. The Russian intelligentsia's literary, social and (what is of special importance in this particular case) political ideals were immediately adopted by the emerging intelligentsias of Russia's national minorities. The bright flame of Russian national culture spread to the farthest outlying regions of the Empire and rekindled the dying or smouldering fires of ethnic cultures there; healthy Russian culture breathed new life into the decrepit organisms of non-Russian nationalities. Owing to the universal respect they commanded everywhere, Russian culture and the Russian intelligentsia accomplished, naturally and without any coercion whatsoever, the great national mission which no government, with all its instruments of violence, is equal to. State unity, built upon the broad and strong foundation of the conscious need for it on the part of all the ethnic groups who have assimilated the common political ideals created by the leading nation, is capable of withstanding any coming trials. This is borne out by every passing day of the current domination of imperial ethnic policy.

The intellectual force and the nation's spirit concentrated in its intellectual elite cannot but take compassion upon other nations' aspirations to freedom

The Russian intelligentsia's noble cooperation with the intelligentsias of the Empire's national minorities has paved the way for the normalization of ethnic relations in Russia. Combined, state unity and ethnic variety will make for a great revival of the Russian Empire through the efforts of renascent nationalities among which the Russian nation takes the lead. However, the implementation of this patriotic idea, which is common to all the citizens of Russia, comes up against difficulties which time alone will remove. The Russian intelligentsia has far from accomplished its historic mission. Nevertheless, its friends and partners – the intelligentsias of all the peoples of the Empire – will always remain loyal to it, and the dismal realitiers of our time will not cloud their cooperation. ■

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Vladimir Alimov, 33, president of the Personality Fund non-governmental missionary organization, has decided to make a screen version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with the help of the world's 30 best film directors. Alimov called his idea "Project 30." He has already received the support of the Human Rights Centre in Geneva and, according to Vladimir, from the Russian president himself. Each of the 30 film directors will shoot his own film that subsequently will be grouped into a 15-hour serial. First it will be shown in Russia and then in other countries of the world. The serial's premiere will take place in December 1993 at the First International Audiovisual Festival on Human Rights, PersonFest. Alexander Sokurov, Yuris Podnieks, Hertz Frank and Richard Likok have agreed to take part in the production of the films. Vladimir Alimov also plans to include in the best thirty Richard Attenboro and Alan Parker. Alimov wants to transfer part of the proceeds received from the realization of the project to the funds of children's homes and reformatories.

Vladimir Alimov grew up in a children's home and tried many professions. He studied at Volgograd Pedagogical Institute and in 1988 organized the Art-Happening Centre engaged in show-business.

"I never cease to be an idealist and I am not so much the president of the fund as I am the president of the idea that I myself design and put into practice," says Vladimir Alimov.

A.Pyasetskaya

* * *

On June 13, 1991, in the city of Petropavlovsk (Northern Kazakhstan), the legal adviser of the V.I.Lenin engineering plant, **Viktor Leontiev,** 27, was sentenced under the law "On the protection of honour and dignity of the USSR President" to two years of corrective labour. According to the comrades of the dissident, to this day Leontiev remains the only person in the USSR who has been sentenced under this law.

It follows from the appeal of the committee for the defence of Leontiev that on March 2, 1991 – the 60th birthday of Mikhail Gorbachev – while selling unofficial publications, including the Anti-Soviet Calendar with cartoons of the President, Viktor "used in respect of Mikhail Gorbachev the expression 'the General Secretary of the CPSU fascist party'" and was arrested for this.

At the trial, the counsel for the defence pointed out that Viktor had nothing to do with the production of the Anti-Soviet Calendar and acted only as its seller. As for the word "fascist," it was used not in respect of the USSR President, but in respect of the CC CPSU General Secretary who, as is known, is not protected by a personal law on the protection of honour and dignity. Besides, Leontiev claimed that he used this word not as an insult, but as a "political science term."

Viktor Leontiev is a member of the Democratic Union party.

* * *

In the middle of last year, Andrei Kolosovsky – one of the most promising and fast progressing diplomats with whom I studied at the institute and who was in line for a prestigious post at the Soviet Mission to the UN in New York – surprised all his friends. Taking his cue from the newly appointed Russian Minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, he left the Union Foreign Ministry for its Russian counterpart.

Having made such a resolute move, Kolosovsky has displayed unprecedented perspicacity. He is going to America after all but in the capacity of the first Russian envoy. He is a special plenipotentiary representative of Russia to the United States with instructions from the Russian President to further the development of political, trade, economic and cultural ties between Russia and the United States of America and to coordinate the activity of the representatives of various state organizations of Russia on American territory. Going to Washington along with the first envoy are his wife and his little son Roman.

In 1978 Kolosovsky graduated from the Faculty of International Journalism of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He worked in the Soviet Embassy in Cuba, in the Foreign Ministry's Directorate of International Organizations and in the secretariat of the deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Petrovsky. In the Russian foreign policy agency he first headed the Political Department and then became deputy Minister.

Among the first envoy's merits there is one that is

From *Vesti* to *Itogi*

On Thursday, November 21, the permanent anchorman of the Russian Television's programme *Vesti* (News), **Evgeny Kiselev,** 35, surprised TV viewers by adding to the traditional "Till our next meeting!" "...next year on National Television."

As early as before the January events in the Baltics, Kiselev was among those who were the first to leave "Kravchenko television" for Russian Television. Now he is among those who are the first to come back to National TV. It would seem that *Vesti* has become the most popular programme on Russian Television, its "visiting card," with the programme's anchormen joining the ranks of the most popular television stars. And suddenly... the resignation? The flight?

Evgeny himself is convinced that *Vesti* and he personally became popular in the old, "pre-putsch" political situation. In those days, as an opposition and even a semi-disgraced programme, *Vesti* could get off scot-free with everything: constant failues on the air, bad picture and sound quality in almost every second piece of reporting, and a lack of reports from other cities. But Kiselev thinks that now the credit of trust has been exhausted. At the same time National Television's currently nameless information programme has all the cards stacked in its favour: state-of-the-art equipment, a broad network of correspondents, and archives. And most important, the former news programme *Vremya* is now run by Oleg Dobrodeev who together with Kiselev was among those who helped *Vesti* to get off the ground. "We want to work with professionals, not democrats," they say.

Dobrodeev and Kiselev are preparing a new programme for National Television that presumably will be called *Itogi* (Review), and will contain a summary of political events for a week. The Itogi programme is scheduled to come on the air for the first time on January 5, 1992.

known only to his close friends and which he tries carefully to conceal, especially from his wife, as the years go by – he is a great gourmet and loves to cook.

G.Sidorova

* * *



The election of **Mikhail Stepanenko,** 48, to one of the highest posts in the USSR Union of Composers created a big stir at the last congress of composers. The hitherto obscure member of the Ukrainian delegation has become the co-chairman of the venerable Tikhon Khrennikov, who was at the helm of the country's music life for 43 years.

Stepanenko lives in Kiev and teaches piano at the local conservatoire. Despite the almost weekly trips to Moscow in order to fulfil his new duties, he does not intend to quit either his native city or his work to which he devoted more than 20 years of his life. He writes music. He gave the following answer to the question "What holds the greatest attraction for him – pedagogics, composing music or public activities?": "History, including music history." He prefers to explore its least studied spheres. For example, he has found and deciphered the score of the first Russian piano concerto that was written in the 18th century by Dmitry Bortnyansky.

Stepanenko inherited a neglected "business" ready to go to pieces the moment the republics begin to divide the common "composers'" property. But he hopes that there is still a chance to stave off the break-up, otherwise he wouldn't have begun so energetically the implementation of the programme with which he came to the chairman's office on Nezhdanova Street. Among the ways of ensuring the survival of the Union of Composers he mentions the transformation of this once unitary organization into a confederation, and all its members – into shareholders. He pins great hopes on cooperation with this country's businessmen.

Correct and efficient, Stepanenko is confident that he can come to terms with anyone. It goes against his grain to accept the division into "our people" and "strangers" that has become a practice among composers. "I never struggle against people," he says. "I come out in favour of or against the given idea."

L.Dolgacheva

* * *

The living legend of British rock, 46-year-old composer and performer **Rod Stewart,** prefers blondes. The maestro's latest flame, photo model **Raychel Hunter,** after several months of a stormy love affair has brought the veteran performer to the altar for the second time in his life. "At last I have found what I was looking for," says satisfied Rod about the long-legged New Zealand lass who is 25 years his junior.

Stewart has always had luck with women. Exceptional inborn charm coupled with a multi-million income and world-wide fame did their trick: all his girlfriends were exceptionally beautiful. Rod's relations with his ex-girlfriends, though, are not always of a peaceful nature. For example, Kelli Embert, with whom the singer lived for six years, was not satisfied with the ten thousand dollars that Rod is paying her every month to support the child. She is trying to sue him for 25 million dollars by way of alimony.

Even more trouble for the "star" has been caused by the "denunciation" by a certain Reigan Newman that appeared in the press on the eve of the marriage. The woman claimed that she was already Stewart's mistress at the time of his "official" liaison with R. Hunter. The readers were shocked by the candid details: as it turned out the "unmasker" and the rocker made love in rather exotic places, including an elevator and a motor boat. Stewart categorically denies all the charges claiming that he knew no one by the name of Newman and had never done "this" in an elevator. He has admitted, though, that a couple of times a fit of love caught him and Raychel in the back seat of a limousine. But to do this in an elevator...

Rod Stewart, who is soon going to celebrate the 30th anniversary of his musical career, has become known as one of the brightest "populists" of the rock-stage. Coming from a worker family, he has not broken with his roots. According to eye-witness accounts, he can often be seen playing football near his house in Los Angeles. As he himself admits his friends are "ordinary guys from the working class neighbourhoods."

The latest, 18th album by Rod Stewart, *The Hobo's Heart,* has been pronounced by the critics as the biggest success of the decade.

O.Vishnyakov

* * *

Born in a ghetto

Several months ago, the professional pianist and graduate of the Gnesins' Institute, **Eleonora Volskaya,** was elected chairwoman of the Board of the Moscow Association of Jews – former prisoners of ghettos and Nazi concentration camps. The new organization has set itself the task of collecting materials about the genocide of the Jewish people during the Great Patriotic War and searching for those who, risking their lives, saved Jews from death. The association intends to make the German government pay compensation for physical and moral damage caused by the Nazis. They have already succeeded in finding about 400 former prisoners who live in Moscow and other cities of Russia.

On one of the summer days of 1943, a two-year-old girl by the name of Sarra Garberaite was smuggled in a sack from the Kaunas ghetto where the invaders had driven together 36,000 Jews. The Lithuanian anti-fascists hid the girl in a secluded place. After the liberation of Lithuania Sarra found herself in an orphanage. Soon thereafter, the then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, Justas Palekis, and the girl's uncle, the well-known singer Mikhail Aleksandrovich, brought her to Moscow. The girl was adopted by the Moscow lawyer, Alexander Volsky. Thus Sarra Garberaite became Eleonora Alexandrovna Volskaya.

The dust

Do we have a national library or not?

The Lenin State Public Library has again surprised the world. On Friday an anouncement appeared on its entrance – sorry, dear readers, we're closing; our salary is too low, there's too much dust inside, the building is ready to fall through, there is no sign of the long-promised reconstruction, and those Hasidim into the bargain. The mention of the last item was to be read between lines.

And thousands of "dear readers," men and women of science, had nothing to do but go home. From Moscow to the country's remotest recesses, so to speak – as the song has it...

Nobody is concerned with the many hundreds of thousands of rubles wasted on tickets from Uryupinsk to Moscow and back plus travelling allowance – we are used to it! No one regrets thousands of design offices and research institutes having failed to receive precious information in time – it's only abroad that information is paid for in gold! In addition, places in transport and rooms in hotels occupied to no purpose – somebody couldn't buy a ticket or had to spend the night at a railway station...

I wonder what is more profitable for a country – to have a national library or not to have one? All countries greatly profit from having national libraries (they provide information!), therefore they are well taken care of everywhere. However, the Lenin Library causes the Soviet government nothing but headaches. Our successive governments can't grasp what use can be made of the Library, while the Library can't understand the point of there existing the Soviet Union and all those impertinent readers who don't want to leave it in peace; one has to serve them, carry books on one's back and breathe dusty air, while there is nothing to eat. Only school graduates may be fools enough to agree to work for the money paid in the Library, if, of course, one manages to talk them into it – no fools nowadays! This is not America where there is too much money to be so easily spent and where librarians have two university diplomas.

Now you have to come to the Lenin Library's reading halls with your own bulbs if you are going to promote science – it's too dark there. The book depository functions only till dusk – it is still darker there, but the personnel can't bring their own bulbs from home... And there's the dust which, according to the administration, hasn't been properly removed since 1985 in spite of monthly sanitation days. The concentration of dust exceeds the critical limit by ten times.

Well, the dust isn't the most dangerous thing – the entire Library is ready to fall through into the Kalininskaya underground station. Just imagine: as you are travelling home a shower of books comes down on your unsuspecting head. You can deem yourself happy if it's *War and Peace* or *Crime and Punishment* that hits you; much worse if it happens to be Marx's *Capital* or Lenin's *How to organize competition?* There are millions of books there – after all, this is the world's second largest depository of learning!

And, of course, there are the Hasidim who spared no effort in order to gain possession of the Schneerson library. The newspaper *Kuranty* wrote that they even urinated in the staircase – probably, there was no other place available. How could one not close the library after that? It's an established fact, although I haven't been an eye-witness to it, that on the same day, after the session of the Court of Arbitration, Hasidim arrived with two lorries loaded with empty boxes to pack up the books and unloaded them right in the director's lobby. The firemen who saw this combustible stuff nearly went mad. It was time to close the library for the night; police were called who began ousting the Hasidim. This resulted in a scuffle.

The director of the New York Hebrew Library was among the Hasidim. He must know better than anyone else that even if the Library had been dying with impatience to return all the books, it couldn't have done it quickly because the corresponding documents had to be written out for every item of storage, which would have taken quite some time...

The Library has a new hero of the day again – head of the manuscript department Victor Deryagin. Connoisseurs remember the fortitude he and his assistants displayed fighting against specialists in M.Bulgakov's literary heritage to thwart their attempts to publish the ideological plague – his manuscripts. M.Deryagin wrote in 1988 that it was absolutely wrong to give the unique manuscripts to scholars who could damage them while they must be preserved for posterity. In 1991 the Russian national patriot and a regular contributor to the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* threatened that, because he loved so dearly "our national treasure" – Hebrew manuscripts – he would burn himself alive together with the manuscripts rather than let the Hasidim get hold of them if it were decided to return them.

For nearly half a year the personnel of the Library has been trying to decide whether or not to go on strike. They couldn't make up their minds for a long time because strikes of librarians, as well as of medical personnel are banned almost world-wide as detrimental to the nation and immoral. The decision was made at last – a small surprise for the Library's director Anatoly Volik, just back from his mission to Mongolia. This small scandal, which may grow into a great scandal, is very handy for those who are just dying to occupy his chair.

Bright minds both in the Library and around it just can't imagine what to do with it, whom to replace there, under whose authority to place it? Gubenko, the Union minister of culture, is unable to do anything; maybe Russian minister of culture Solomin will? Or should we, probably, turn directly to Yeltsin? Unfortunately, he is too busy, Gorbachev is not so occupied... Shall we rather address all four – a nice quartet it is going to be! And write a letter to the United Nations or to UNESCO...

I wonder, nevertheless, what is more profitable for the republics – successors of the former USSR – to have a library like the Lenin Library or not to have one? And for Russia alone – to have or not to have?

Now the Lenin Library resembles a lonely dying man's house from which all try to snatch something – a book, a manuscript, or remnants of its reputation...

Yevgeny Kuzmin

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

A prominent heart surgeon dead



One photojournalist whose name I regrettably cannot recall, took a remarkable picture once when he was preparing a report on the Heart Surgery Department of the Moscow Regional Clinical Research Centre: a man's hand with the index finger clasped in a baby's first. The picture conveyed so much pain, hope and compassion that it was reproduced in many periodicals and finally became the Clinical Research Centre's badge.

The Department was headed by Prof. Vyacheslav Frantsev – it was his finger in the photo. It was he who gave hope and health to patients. The main thing about him, however, was his ability to offer unlimited compassion: never in my life have I seen a kinder man. Some people might disagree, but I still think that in the medical profession kindness is often more important than the scalpel...

Trained by the celebrated surgeons Bakulev and Meshalkin, Frantsev was one of the world's best pediatrist heart surgeons. On his return from one of his journeys to the United States I asked him about the elite of the world's surgeons:

"Can you operate like Cooley or DeBakey?

A person of rare professional modesty, he laughed mischievously and said:

"With their equipment? With their organization? When you have as much blood for transfusion as you need? Of course, I can!"

He was a happy man – Cand. Sc. (Medicine) at 28, D. Sc. at 34 (the youngest in the country at the time). He headed a clinic, has published 330 scientific works and articles and three monographs; 12 Doctors and 38 Candidates of science were among his disciples; he was a State Prize laureate and had a wonderful wife, daughter and grandson Nikita. He had many good friends. Among them there were fighter Yengibaryan, poet Rozhdestvensky, journalist Rost, rocket specialist Chudetsky, singer Kobson, police Lieutenant General Borisenkov, composer Bogoslovsky, not to mention the people of medical profession. As excited as he was about medicine, he was even more excited about life. This is a sure sign of true talent. And one more thing – few people can be called Russian intellectuals today. Frantsev was one, however, which was determined not by his clean handkerchiefs or good manners, but by his lively and inquisitive mind, tactfulness and physical inability to humiliate a man by gesture or by word. Self-irony was inseparable from his philosophy. He felt a profound contempt for bribe-takers of whom there are many among medics (he personally new quite a few celebrated doctors who took bribes). He was characterized by an active civic stance and democratic outlook. He was very disappointed to hear his respected teacher Meshalkin's speeches at the Supreme Soviet ("He has no business being there! He's a great surgeon, not a politician!" Frantsev would often cry out watching televized Supreme Soviet debates). He spoke beautiful Russian and was a true friend...

Frantsev was a happy man, indeed. How could we have allowed him to die at 61? He operated on children's hearts. Many times he operated on babies who were only several hours old. He would put soft and tiny cords on their small hands and feet and they looked like little Christs. He saw them as saviours, the future saviours of Russia. He saved so many hearts that his own heart failed him, but if he could have performed surgery on himself he would surely have called me this evening to find out how I was getting along.

I would not have had to write this obituary, I would not have been busy, and we would have met at his place over a bottle of a good wine...

Yaroslav Golovanov

Photo by Yury Rost

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